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Abstract
Evaluating the costs and benefits of exchange rate stability requires a somewhat different approach
for Mercosur than for the EU. EU member countries are highly integrated in terms of trade in goods
and services. By contrast, trade integration within Mercosur is much more limited,  intra-area
exchange rates are thus less important than the exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar and the euro. This
contribution analyses the impact of both aspects of financial volatility (exchange rate and interest
rate volatility) on investment and labor markets in the Southern Cone, finding that both exchange
rate variability (mainly against the dollar and the euro) and (domestic) interest rate volatility have a
significant dampening impact on employment and  investment, as predicted by our theoretical
model.
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1.   Introduction 
After the forced exit from its currency board arrangements Argentina has joined its neighbors 
in the Southern Cone in terms of its exchange rate arrangement. Is this a reason to stop dis-
cussing the issue of monetary integration in this area of Latin America?
1 We would argue no. 
The costs and benefits of fluctuating exchange rates in southern Latin America deserve an-
other look. Europe seemed to have landed in a similar situation when in 1992/3/5 speculative 
attacks forced all the major currencies participating in the European Monetary System to 
loosen their exchange rate commitment (FRF, PTE) or abandon the system completely (ITL, 
GBP). However, monetary union did still start on schedule because despite intense market 
pressure policy makers consistently stuck to the policy choices required by the project of 
European monetary integration. It is thus entirely possible that monetary integration will one 
day again become a real option for the Mercosur area as well. 
Our approach was inspired by the European experience. Previous research by the authors has 
shown that exchange rate variability can have a significant impact on the economy, and in 
particular on labor markets. The results are especially strong for intra-European exchange rate 
variability. This is not surprising in view of the importance of intra-European trade (both in 
absolute terms, e.g., as a percent of GDP, and relative to trade with the rest of the world). 
Should one expect to find similar results for Mercosur countries? It is difficult to give an im-
mediate answer because there is one key difference between Europe and the Southern Cone: 
trade among the Mercosur countries used to be much less important than the trade of these 
countries with the rest of the world (mostly the EU and the US). 
We document the difference in the degree of trade integration within the EU and within the 
Southern Cone in section 2 as this might be an important background for the subsequent em-
pirical analysis.
2 The core of the paper starts in chapter 3 where we investigate the impact of 
two aspects of financial volatility - namely exchange rate and interest rate volatility -on in-
vestment and labor markets in the Southern Cone. We present first a theoretical model which 
shows why exchange rate volatility should affect investment decisions negatively, then com-
ment on some first empirical results (chapter 4) and then provide some robustness tests (chap-
                                                           
1 Before the outbreak of the Argentina crisis, some authors like, e.g., Eichengreen (1998) and Giambiagi (1999) 
even discussed the sense or nonsense of a common currency for the Mercosur member countries. Corresponding 
declarations of intention were made at that time by policy circles, i.e. the president of Argentina, Fernando de la 
Rúa, and by the president of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. An instructive source in this respect is Levy 
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000). 
2 See Belke and Gros (2002a) for a thorough analysis of the correlation between these two aspects of financial 
market volatility.  
ter 5). Chapter 6 concludes and discusses the implications of the results for the debate on the 
design of intra-Mercosur monetary relations. 
2.   Comparative picture of the degree of trade integration within the EU 
and within the Southern Cone 
We provide first a comparative picture of the degree of trade integration within the EU and 
within the Southern Cone. We leave out Paraguay from our analysis, because no data were 
available from GTAP. Hence, in the following we define Argentina, Brazil and sometimes, if 
data are available, Uruguay as ‘the Mercosur’.
3 This paper focuses on Argentina and Brazil, 
because both countries together represent 95 % of the 215 million total population of the 
Mercosur and produce 97 percent of this region’s GDP. Moreover, the ‘peripheral’ countries 
Paraguay and Uruguay are closely tied to Argentina and Brazil via the trade channel, have 
very small internal markets and limited access to international capital markets. Hence, they 
cannot be analyzed according to the same criteria like Argentina and Brazil. Chile, not in 
Mercosur, serves as a comparator. EU means EU-15 throughout the paper. 
Table 1:   Trade integration within the Southern Cone 
  Exports as % of GDP 
Intra-regional/
Extra-regional
 Total  Intra-regional   
Argentina  8.9  2.7  0.44 
Brazil  7.6  0.9  0.13 
Chile  26.5  2.8  0.11 
Spain  26.6  16.4  1.61 
Sources: Center for Global Trade Analysis (2001), own calculations for 1999 
Table 1 shows the importance of trade for Southern Cone countries and compares it with one 
EU member country, Spain (whose figures are not far from the EU average). This table shows 
clearly that the two Mercosur countries are outliers because of the low importance of trade 
(less than 10 % of GDP for both). The data also show that Mercosur does not really qualify as 
a trade bloc given that for Brazil trade with Argentina amounts less than one sevenths of its 
exports outside the region. However, for Argentina intra-regional trade is more important. It is 
                                                           
3  For consistency reasons, we use the package GTAP Version 5 Data Base, Center for Global Trade Analysis 
(2001) from Purdue University, USA, for any calculations concerning, e.g., trade weights throughout the whole 
paper.  
interesting to note that a neighboring country, like Chile, which is not in Mercosur, is as inte-
grated with this block as Argentina. 
Table 2 shows the importance of importers of Mercosur goods and services. We disaggregate 
with respect to the destination of exported goods and services by differentiating between indi-
vidual Mercosur countries and the two trade blocs EU-15 and NAFTA. For example, exports 
from Argentina to Brazil had a share of 2.4 percent of Argentina’s GDP. Two main features 
emerge. First, a closer inspection of the shares of the extra-Mercosur trade blocs in Table 2 
corroborates the general picture developed by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000), pp. 72 
ff., that Mercosur is in principle not designed as a trading bloc relatively close to the rest of 
the world. Instead, the strategy consisted of a general unilateral opening to third countries and 
a policy of preferential access to neighbors. There is again a clear difference to the working of 
the EU project which tends to make intra-regional trade cheaper and to increase extra-regional 
barriers. Second, both for Argentina and Brazil the EU is the more important trade partner 
than the NAFTA. This relation is even more pronounced for Argentina (see also IMF, Direc-
tions of trade, various issues and Alesina and Barro 2001, p. 384). 
Mercosur countries are rather closed economies. Was that different in the past? Figure 1 sug-
gests that this has always been the case. It is interesting to note that during the 1960s Spain 
had about the same degree of openness than Argentina and Brazil. However, this changed 
over time, and in particular since Spain joined the EU. Nevertheless, EU membership is not 
the only reason for the difference. Even within the Southern Cone there are large differences. 
Chile, as a somewhat smaller economy than Argentina should be somewhat more open. This 
was already the case during the 1960s, but the difference between Chile and its neighbors has  
actually increased considerably over the last decade. One could thus argue that Argentina and 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own calculations based on Directions of Trade (IMF). 
Overall the data on trade flows indicate that (despite the increase which has taken place over 
the last years) the volume of trade among the Southern Cone countries is still of a different 
order of importance than that of intra-EU trade. This basic pattern is totally consistent with 
the findings by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000), pp. 68 ff., who state that the degree of 
interdependence between Mercosur countries, as measured by trade flows, is much lower than 
it was for EMU members even at the time of the “Werner Report” when monetary union was 
proposed for the first time in Europe. The dramatic increase in regional trade between the 
largest partners, Argentina and Brazil (around 400 % between 1991 and 1997) albeit starting 
from a low level is mainly due to the fact that the member countries increased their total trade 
volumes significantly. In this sense, Mercosur did not foster trade reorientation but did only 
accompany the general opening process experienced in Latin America in the last decade. 
Given the relatively low importance of trade for Mercosur countries, we would argue that for 
this group the analysis of the costs and benefits of regional exchange rate arrangements must 
be seen not only in terms of the impact stable exchange rates might have on trade, but more in 
terms of the overall macroeconomic stability that might result. In the following, we investi-
gate therefore the correlation between two aspects of financial market volatility, namely ex-
change rate and interest rate volatility, and the real sector. If Latin America is different in the 
sense that there is little intra-regional trade, the link to the dollar should be more important 
than the intra-regional fixes.  
3.   Modeling the impact of exchange rate volatility on labor markets 
In the following, we first introduce a consistent model and develop testable hypotheses in 
order to investigate possible consequences of exchange rate and interest rate volatility in Mer-
cosur countries. The resulting hypotheses are then tested empirically. At first, however, we 
would like to elaborate on our motivation behind these efforts. 
3.1   Motivation 
The exchange rates between the G-3 and those between Mercosur and G-3 currencies (and 
less so via cross-rates also the intra-Mercosur exchange rates) are closely watched exchange 
rates in Latin America. Their gyrations, which are at times difficult to understand on purely 
economic grounds, are often perceived to be politically costly. The relevance of exchange rate 
variability as a proxy for risk for the Brazilian economic activity has already been empha-
sized, e.g., by Paredes (1989) and Coes (1981). Intuitively, for instance a dollar-peg would 
not do justice to Argentina’s and Brazil’s structure of foreign trade and might hamper their 
international competitiveness. The main reason is that this peg does not shelter these Merco-
sur economies from exchange rate variability vis-à-vis the euro or the yen (Krugman and 
Obstfeld 2000, pp. 525 ff.). Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) claim that G-3 exchange rate and 
interest rate volatility would seem a priori to have a negative effect on economic growth in 
the developing world. Higher interest rate volatility may delay investment whereas higher G-3 
exchange rate volatility may hamper emerging market trade.
4  
However, their basic empirical results based on simple sample splits and on fundamental re-
gressions testing for the relevance of specific G-3 factors let them conclude that enforcing 
target zones in the G-3 currencies merely means choosing a point along the tradeoff between 
lower exchange rate volatility and higher interest volatility. Their results are ambiguous with 
respect to the welfare effects of suppressing volatility. Only when they refer their sample split 
tests to the joint behavior of the relevant volatilities, they are able to deliver empirical evi-
dence in favor of at least net positive growth impacts of reducing G-3 exchange rate volatility 
in emerging market economies, even if interest (and, by this, also consumption) volatility has 
increased at the same time. Seen on the whole, the case for limiting G-3 exchange rate volatil-
ity is not given from the point of view of emerging countries according to the results by 
Reinhart and Reinhart (2001). However, it has to be noted that their results are driven by their 
specific assumptions underlying the transmission mechanism of financial market volatility on 
                                                           
4 See Calvo and Reinhart (2000a), pp. 15 ff., and Reinhart and Reinhart (2001), p. 10.  
the real sector. Moreover, the results also suggest that direct benefits to emerging market 
economies should have their origin only in suppressed volatility of their own trade-weighted 
currencies. According to Rose (1999), a country should prefer adopting a common currency 
to target zones in this case. 
It has even been argued in the wake of the large devaluation of the Brazilian real while Argen-
tina was still caught in its currency board arrangements that movements of the dollar-euro rate 
comparable to those of the mark-dollar rate since 1971 would break the Mercosur apart (Fi-
nancial Times 2001, Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2000). This was an argument about the 
appropriate level (of the effective rate for the Argentinean peso), rather than volatility, which 
is our main issue. 
The starting assumption of most economists is likely to be that exchange rate variability can-
not have a significant impact on labor markets (whether in OECD economies or in emerging 
markets) given that the link between exchange rate variability and the volume of trade is 
known to be weak. However, there are two reasons why exchange rate volatility should have 
a strong negative impact on emerging markets’ economies and, hence, may constitute the ba-
sis for the fear of large exchange rate swings (Calvo and Reinhart 2000a). First, the pattern of 
trade invoicing is different in emerging markets as compared to that in industrial countries. 
Following McKinnon (1999), primary commodities are primarily dollar invoiced. Since the 
Mercosur countries’ exports have a high primary commodity content (see Belke and Gros 
2002a, Table 3), exchange rate volatility should have a significant impact on foreign trade of 
these countries. This is especially valid for Argentina with its primary product share of 48.2 
percent of total domestic value added induced by exports. However, even the lower respective 
values for Brazil (25.8%), and Uruguay (28.5%) are extremely large as compared with the EU 
trade bloc (5.5%). Second, the capital markets in emerging markets are of an incomplete na-
ture. If futures markets are either illiquid or even nonexistent, tools for hedging the exchange 
rate risk are simply not available in these countries. As a complement, emerging markets are 
on average more intolerant to large exchange rate fluctuations because the pass-through from 
exchange rate swings to inflation is much higher in emerging markets (Calvo and Reinhart 
2000a, pp. 18 f.). 
Why would an increase in exchange rate volatility lead quickly to a lower volume (flow) of 
trade? The theoretical models that are used in this context start typically from the idea that in 
order to export one needs to sustain a sunk cost. This implies for all types of production, and 
perhaps even more for primary goods, which require large sunk capital investments. In view  
of the relatively low trade linkages between Mercosur countries and the importance of pri-
mary commodities which are typically priced in dollars it might as well be argued that intra-
Mercosur exchange rate variability should be of less concern than G-3 exchange rate volatility 
for the Mercosur countries.
5 However, as we emphasize throughout this paper, the impact of 
exchange rate volatility might still be large even in the light of a relatively low degree of trade 
openness because the volatilities themselves were high at times for Mercosur countries. 
Another approach is that excess volatility of G-3 exchange rates is perceived to be costly for 
those emerging markets which link their currencies to the dollar because large swings in dol-
lar’s exchange rate on the foreign exchange market change their competitiveness (Reinhart 
and Reinhart 2001, p. 21, Calvo and Reinhart 2000). This is called the spending channel. Ac-
cording to this view, many developing countries are in ‘fear of floating’ directly or indirectly 
(with respect to G-3 volatility) and, hence, link their currencies to the dollar or the euro via a 
hard peg or a managed float. Examples were Argentina for a “fixed exchange rate regime” 
(March 1991 – December 2001) and both Brazil (‘plano real’ July 1994 – December 1998) 
and Uruguay (throughout) for regimes of “managed floating” (Calvo and Reinhart (2000), 
Tables 5 and 7). 
Are we legitimized then to transfer the European transmission channel to the Mercosur? Dur-
ing the past decade, Latin American governments implemented economic reforms that af-
fected almost every sector. Nonetheless, in most countries labor markets remain highly regu-
lated. As of the late 90’s, only a handful of Latin American nations had reformed their labor 
markets in any significant way, while most continued to rely on labor legislation enacted sev-
eral decades earlier.
6 This legislation has favored employment protection while taxing em-
ployers heavily. Most analysts argue that the social protection provided through labor market 
regulation limits the market's ability to adjust wages and unemployment. Moreover, social 
protection is seen as the principal cause of large pockets of "precarious" employment, that is, 
                                                           
5 An additional argument would be that intra-regional capital flows within the Mercosur are much lower than 
flows with countries outside Mercosur. Hence, only exchange rate variability with external currencies should 
generate quantitatively important speculative capital flows. From this perspective, the main benefits of EMU in 
the European context (disappearing speculative inflows in the wake of capital market liberalization) do not apply 
for Mercosur, although capital flow volatility is much higher in the Mercosur than in the EU. See Levy Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2000), pp. 77 f. 
6 In Argentina, discussions about labor market reforms have been the central focus of the public economic policy 
debate in the last few years. Labor legislation has been modified as a condition of support by the IMF. However, 
even the two major changes in labor market legislation 1991 and 1995 introduced flexibility only at the margin. 
See extensively Hopenhayn (2001), pp. 3 ff. For first modest steps taken by Brazil in August 1998 to relax ob-
stacles to part-time employment, to reduce costs of hiring and firing, e.g. costs of temporary layoffs, and foster-
ing flexible modes of overtime compensation see Eichengreen (1998), pp. 31 ff. On economic reforms and labor 
markets in Latin American countries in general see Edwards, Cox Edwards (2000).  
employment that does not receive any of the benefits and protection awarded by current legis-
lation.
7 Many of the rules governing labor markets in Latin America raise labor costs, create 
barriers to entry and exit, and, hence, introduce rigidities in the employment structure. As in 
continental Europe, these rigidities include the exceedingly restrictive regulations on hiring 
and firing practices, as well as burdensome social insurance schemes. Most importantly, they 
prevent countries from reacting rapidly to new challenges from increased foreign competition. 
In contrast, e.g., to the Carribean, Labor Codes are much more encompassing in the scope of 
matters regulated and favor indefinite, full-time labor contracts through detailed regulation of 
probationary periods, benefits, and severance payments in case of separation. Employment 
stability protection like mandated severance payments and other regulations penalizing em-
ployment termination in Latin America is even stricter than in the majority of the OECD 
countries (Heckman and Pagés 2000, Márquez and Pagés 1998).  
After controlling for differences in education and firm size, job security increases job duration 
in Latin America. Finally, union density is falling in Latin America (although still double as 
high as in the U.S., i.e. above 25 % of the non-agricultural labor force in Argentina and Bra-
zil). The collective bargaining coverage rate (e.g., Argentina 72 % of formal sector workers) 
is lower than in Europe (between 80 and 90 percent in most countries) but higher than in East 
Asian countries. The reason is that, with the exception of Uruguay with its highly centralized 
bargaining system, pervasive state interventions traditionally lower incentives of workers to 
organize themselves in unions. State intervention tended to centralize collective bargaining in 
Argentina and Brazil as opposed to Peru and Chile where it decentralized collective bargain-
ing. Hence, Argentina and Brazil systems can be considered as corporatist and highly inter-
ventionist systems whereas Uruguay can be regarded as rather unregulated (Márquez and 
Pagés 1998). 
Given the importance of this debate, remarkable little empirical research is available on the 
relationship between labor market regulations and labor market performance in Latin Amer-
ica. The main purpose of recent empirical studies like Edwards and Cox Edwards (2000), 
Edwards and Lustig (1997), Heckman and Pagés (2000), and Márquez and Pagés (1998) is to 
help fill this gap. However, the main message from all these studies is that the bulk of impact 
of job security legislation in Latin America is on employment and not on unemployment 
(Heckman and Pagés 2000). This basic insight is important for our empirical investigation 
which should thus primarily focus on employment rather than on unemployment rates. As 
                                                           
7 However, others believe that dismantling existing labor regulations will worsen social conditions and increase  
shown by Lazear (1990), this result is not unusual because a reduction in employment is mir-
rored by a decline of participation rates if workers’ participation decisions are determined by 
job security policies. 
Although we spent much efforts in order to use the best available labor market data (for the 
exact sources see annex A5) we are well aware of the fact that our analysis might be ham-
pered by the existence of a large amount of inofficial employment in the Mercosur countries. 
This so-called informal sector is even more important in Brazil than in Argentina. Due to 
these facts, registered unemployment figures might be only a poor proxy for actual figures. 
Most significant in Latin America in the past was the rise of open urban unemployment which 
reached double-digits in most countries in the nineties (and for Uruguay already in the eight-
ies), a time in which reasonably reliable statistics have become available. The relevant unem-
ployment figures are presented in Figure 2. 













Note: Data are normalized for comparability reasons. For data sources see annex A5. 
As already noted previously, unemployment and underemployment are measured differently 
and thus comparisons across countries are strictly speaking not warranted. Still, the fact that 
unemployment rates, however measured, climbed significantly in country after country is in-
dicative of a consistent regional trend. What this trend suggests is that increases in informal 
employment did not function as an effective counter-cyclical mechanism against the contrac-
tion of the so-called modern sector. Instead, both informality and open unemployment grew 
together in most countries. As a result, masses of people found themselves without access 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
poverty and income inequality.  
even to the meager earnings drawn in the past from odd-jobbing, street vending, and other 
informal activities. 
However, the existence of an in-official sector should not matter too much for regressions if 
one uses changes of employment. Moreover, data on employment refers of course only on 
official employment, i.e. those officially declared and thus subject to social security contribu-
tions, income tax, and all official labor market regulations. This implies that we not take into 
account the potentially very large grey or underground economy for data availability reasons. 
The focus on the official labor market is, however, entirely appropriate. In the grey economy 
the cost of firing are presumably much lower because official employment regulations do not 
apply. This implies that our model of firing costs applies mainly to official employment and 
we would expect volatility to be mainly a deterrent to official employment. Data on (official) 
employment is usually much more accurate than data on unemployment, because the defini-
tion of who is looking for work, but unable to find it, changes often. Moreover, the geo-
graphical coverage of the unemployment statistics changes over time as well, at times the na-
tional unemployment data reflect mainly data from one or two major provinces. Employment 
data, by contrast is usually nation-wide because it encompasses all people on the social secu-
rity registers. 
Hence, seen on the whole, we feel legitimized to transfer the transmission channel which was 
originally established for the EU to the Mercosur when modeling the impacts of exchange rate 
volatility on labor markets. By this, we follow the general perception that labor markets are 
very rigid in the Mercosur countries and, above all, labor markets in Argentina are even more 
scleroticized than its European counterparts (Galiani and Nickell 1998, Levy Yeyati and Stur-
zenegger 2000, pp. 74 ff.) 
3.2   The model 
The goal of this section is to develop a simple model apart from the Reinhart and Reinhart 
(2001) spending channel to illustrate a mechanism that explains a negative relationship be-
tween exchange rate uncertainty and job creation.
8 This model has originally been based on 
the idea that uncertainty of future earnings raises the ‘option value of waiting’ with decisions 
which concern investment projects in general (see Dixit 1989, Belke and Gros 2001). In this 
framework, we now model the labor market more explicitly. 
                                                           
8 For a similar model that analyzes the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on investment, see Belke and Gros 
(2001).  
When firms open a job, they have to incur sunk costs (hiring and capital costs). Moreover, 
wage payments are typically also sunk since firing restrictions and employment contracts pre-
vent the firms from firing the workers too rapidly. If the exchange rate is uncertain, firms fear 
an unfavorable appreciation of the (domestic) currency in which case they incur heavy losses. 
With high uncertainty, firms may prefer to delay job creation, and this is even so if they are 
risk-neutral. Moreover, the better the bargaining position of workers is, the higher is the op-
tion value of waiting and the stronger is the impact of uncertainty on employment. Since gen-
erous unemployment compensation systems, union power and firing restrictions generally 
improve the bargaining position of workers (chapter 3.1), we would expect that the link be-
tween exchange rate uncertainty and employment should be rather strong in scleroticized 
Mercosur member countries. 
The second goal is (chapters 4 and 5) to provide some casual empirical evidence on the nega-
tive relation between exchange rate and interest rate uncertainty and labor markets in the 
Mercosur. We consider the influence of two measures of return variability, namely exchange 
rate and interest rate variability potentially of the Mercosur member countries
9 on two key 
labor market indicators, changes in unemployment rates and employment growth, and 
changes in investment.
10 Our results confirm the theoretical presumption that there is a nega-
tive impact of exchange rate and interest rate variability on (un-) employment and investment 
in countries like Argentina and Brazil whose labor markets are generally perceived to be 
rather rigid.  
The literature provides other mechanisms through which uncertainty may have an adverse 
impact on employment. First, in unionized labor markets in which contract wages are set in 
advance, uncertainty in labor demand (coming from uncertainty in productivity or in the ex-
change rate) may cause rational unions to set a higher wage than would otherwise be the case. 
Uncertainty results in a ´risk premium` in the wage, and thus in higher unemployment (An-
dersen and Sorensen 1988 and Sorensen 1992). Another channel by which uncertainty might 
affect employment is via its impact on investment. Our theoretical arguments are equally 
valid for firms who decide about an investment project, and, by the same reasoning, high un-
                                                           
9 For an analysis of the costs of intra-European variability for European labor markets which was suppressed by 
EMU see Belke and Gros (2001). 
10 These are the two politically most important variables of the indicators linked to popular explanations of the 
impact of financial volatility on the real sector (Dixit (1989), Aizenman and Marion 1996, Ramey and Ramey 
1995).  
certainty might induce firms to postpone investment projects (see Belke and Gros 2001).
11 
Unemployment can be expected to rise if investment falls because investment is an important 
component of demand. Moreover, technological complementarities between labor and capital 
imply that a capital slowdown entails a fall in employment (see e.g. Rowthorn 1999). 
In the following, we present a simple model of job creation and exchange rate uncertainty to 
illustrate the basic idea underlying the 'option value of waiting' à la Dixit (1989). The model 
which heavily relies on Belke and Kaas (2002) does not pretend to be close to reality. It is 
designed to convey the basic idea in a simple way. Moreover, our intention is to present a 
model that allows us to ask whether even a temporary, short-run increase in uncertainty can 
have a strong impact on employment, and how this impact depends on labor market parame-
ters. 
Consider a set-up in which there are three periods and a single firm active in an export-
oriented industry decides about job creation. During the first two periods (called zero and 
one) the firm can open a job, hire a worker and produce output that is sold in a foreign market 
during the following periods. If the job is created during period zero, the worker is hired for 
two periods (zero and one) to produce output to be sold in periods one and two. If the job is 
created in period one, the worker is hired only for period one and output is sold in period two.
 
To create a job, the firm pays a start-up cost c which reflects the cost of hiring, training and 
the provision of job-specific capital. After a job is created, a worker is hired and is paid a 
wage w above the worker’s fallback (or reservation) wage w during every period the worker 
is employed. The fallback wage measures (besides disutility of work) all opportunity income 
that the worker has to give up by accepting the job. In particular, it includes unemployment 
benefits, but it might also be positively related to a collective wage set by a trade union or to a 
minimum wage, both of which should raise the worker’s fallback position. In general, we 
would argue that the fallback wage should be higher in countries that are characterized by 
generous unemployment benefit systems, by strong trade unions or by minimum wage legisla-
tion.  
In every period in which the worker is employed, he produces output to be sold in the follow-
ing period in a foreign market at domestic price p which has a certain component p
* (the for-
eign price) plus a stochastic component e (the exchange rate). We assume that the foreign 
                                                           
11 Aizenman and Marion (1999) provide further empirical evidence on a negative relation between various 
volatility measures and private investment. They argue that increasing volatility has a negative impact on 
investment if investors are disappointment-averse. Moreover, in the presence of credit constraints, realized 
investment is on average lower when investment demand is more volatile, since credit constraints bind more  
price is fixed (‘pricing to market’ or dollar invoiced exports), and that the exchange rate fol-
lows a random walk. In period one, the exchange rate e1 is uniformly distributed between –σ1 
and +σ1. The exchange rate in period two, e2, is uniformly distributed between e1–σ2 and 
e1+σ2. An increase in σi means an increase in uncertainty, or an increase in the mean preserv-
ing spread in period i=1,2 (σi is proportional to the standard deviation of ei). Uncertainty can 
be temporary (e.g. if σ1>0 and σ2=0) or persistent (if also σ2>0). As will become apparent 
soon, however, the variability of the exchange rate during the second period has no influence 
on the result.
12  
The wage rate w for the job is determined by the (generalized) Nash bargaining solution that 
maximizes a weighted product of the worker’s and the firm’s expected net return from the 
job. We assume that both the firm and the worker are risk-neutral. This assumption implies 
that risk-sharing issues are of no importance for our analysis. Thus we may assume realisti-
cally (but without loss of generality) that the worker and the firm bargain about a fixed wage 
rate w (which is independent of realizations of the exchange rate) when the worker is hired, so 
that the firm bears all the exchange rate risk. A wage contract which shifts some exchange 
rate risk to the worker would leave the (unconditional) expected net returns unaffected, and 
has therefore no effect on the job creation decision. Of course, if the firm was risk-averse, the 
assumption that the firm bears all exchange rate risk would make a postponement of job crea-
tion in the presence of uncertainty even more likely. 
Consider first the wage bargaining problem for a job created in period zero in which case the 
worker is hired for two periods. After the job is created (and the job creation cost is sunk), the 
(unconditional) expected net return of this job is equal to E0(S0) = 2p
*–2w = 2π where π=p
*−w 
denotes the expected return of a filled job per period (we abstract from discounting). Denoting 
the bargaining power of the worker by 0<β<1, the firm’s net return from the job created in pe-
riod zero is
13  
(1) E0(Π0) = (1–β)E0(S0) – c = 2(1–β)π – c . 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
average lower when investment demand is more volatile, since credit constraints bind more often. Real impacts 
of volatility are also confirmed by Ramey and Ramey (1995). 
12An interesting aspect of this crude model is that it does not contain an often used assumption, namely that the un-
certainty is resolved at the end of the first period. In reality uncertainty is usually not resolved, but persists. In a 
model with an infinite horizon this could imply that the same decision represents itself every period in the same way. 
A monetary union constitutes an exception to the rule that uncertainty just continues in the sense that the start of it 
should definitely eliminate uncertainties about the economic environment. In this sense, the start of a monetary union 
might boost employment. 
13 Formally, the wage bargain leads to a wage rate maximizing the Nash product (2w-2w)
β(2p*-2w)
1-β whose 
solution is w=(1-β)w+βp*, and hence the expected net return for the firm is 2p*-2w-c=(1-β)(2p*-2w)-c.  
In order to make the problem non-trivial, the expected return from job creation in period zero 
must be positive, i.e. we assume that 2(1–β)π–c > 0.  
Implicit in our model is the assumption that the firm and the worker sign a binding employ-
ment contract for two periods (zero and one). Hence they cannot sign a contract that allows 
for the possibility of job termination in the first period whenever the exchange rate turns out 
to be unfavorable. In period one (after realization of the exchange rate) the conditional expected 
surplus from job continuation is E1(S1)=π+e1 which may be negative if the exchange rate falls in 
period one below –π<0. In such circumstances, both the worker and the firm would benefit from 
termination. If a contract allowing for termination in period one could be signed, the uncondi-
tional expected surplus in period zero would be larger (consequently both the worker and the 
firm would prefer to sign such a contract).
14 However, having in mind the interpretation of a 
rather short period length (a month, to be compatible with our empirical analysis), the assump-
tion of a binding contract for two periods seems to be more appropriate. Of course, once a bind-
ing contract for two periods is signed, the worker always prefers continuation (since the contract 
wage exceeds the fallback wage), and the firm would incur losses if the exchange rate turns out 
to be unfavorable. Later on in this chapter we consider an alternative set-up which allows for the 
possibility of job destruction. It turns out that in this case uncertainty does not delay job creation, 
but job destruction becomes more likely if uncertainty increases. Hence, the negative relationship 
between exchange rate variability and employment is robust to this variation.  
If the firm waits until period one it keeps the option of whether or not to open a job. It will 
create a job only if the exchange rate realised during period one (and so expected for period 
two) is above a certain threshold level, or barrier, denoted by b. Given that an employment 
relationship in period one yields a return only during period two, this barrier to make the crea-
tion of the job just worthwhile is given by the condition that the (conditional) expected net 
return to the firm is zero:  
(2) (1−β)(p
* + b – w) − c = 0 or b = c/(1−β) + w – p
* = c/(1−β) – π . 
Whenever e1 ≥ b, the firm creates a job in period one, and the conditional expected net return 
to the firm is E1(Π1) = (1–β)(π+e1)−c ≥ 0. Whenever e1 < b, the firm does not create a job in 
period one, and its return is zero. Hence, whenever both events occur with positive probabili-
                                                           
14 Of course, such a flexible contract implies that some exchange rate risk is shared between the worker and the 
firm. However, the reason why they both benefit is not the risk-sharing aspect, but the fact that the flexible con-
tract excludes continuation of unprofitable work relationships.  
ties (i.e. whenever σ1 > b > −σ1)
15, the unconditional expected return of waiting in period zero 
is given by:  
(3) E0(Π1) = [(σ1 + b)/(2σ1)]0 + [(σ1 – b)/( 2σ1)][(1–β)(π + (σ1+b)/2) − c] , 
where the first element is the probability that it will not be worthwhile to open a job (in this 
case the return is zero). The second term represents the product of the probability that it will 
be worthwhile to open the job (because the exchange rate is above the barrier) and the average 
expected value of the net return to the firm under this outcome. Given condition (2) this can 
be rewritten as:  
(4) E0(Π1) = (1–β) (σ1−b)
2 / (4σ1) .  
This is the key result since it implies that an increase in uncertainty increases the value of the 
waiting strategy, since equation (4) is an increasing function of σ1.
16 As σ1 increases it 
becomes more likely that it is worthwhile to wait until more information is available about the 
expected return during period two. At that point the firm can avoid the losses that arise if the 
exchange rate is unfavorable by not opening a job. This option not to open the job becomes 
more valuable with more uncertainty. The intuitive explanation is that waiting implies that the 
firm foregoes the expected return during period one, but it keeps the option not to open the 
job which is valuable if the exchange rate turns out to be unfavorable. The higher the variance 
the higher the potential losses the firm can avoid and the higher the potential for a very 
favorable realization of the exchange rate, with consequently very high profits.  
It is now clear from (1) and (4) that a firm prefers to wait if and only if  
(5) (1−β)(σ1–b)
2 / (4σ1) > 2(1−β)π – c . 
As the left hand side is increasing in σ1, the firm delays job creation if exchange rate uncer-
tainty is large enough. The critical value at which (5) is satisfied with equality can be solved as
 17   
(6)  σ1
* = 3π − c/(1−β) + 2 π(2π c/(1 β)) −−  . 
                                                           
15 We do not a priori restrict the sign of the barrier b. Hence one of these conditions is automatically satisfied, 
whereas the other is satisfied only if uncertainty is large enough. 
16 Formally this results from the fact that equation (4) is only valid whenever σ1 exceeds b (otherwise the ex-
change rate could never exceed the barrier and the firm never creates a job in period 1) and whenever −σ1 is 
lower than b (otherwise the exchange rate could never fall below the barrier and the firm always creates a job in 
period one).  
Whenever σ1>σ1
*, firms decide to postpone job creation in period zero. Since σ1
* is increas-
ing in π (and thereby decreasing in the fallback wage w), decreasing in the cost of job creation 
c and decreasing in the worker’s bargaining power β, we conclude that a strong position of 
workers in the wage bargain (reflected in a high fallback wage or in the bargaining power 
parameter) and higher costs of hiring raise the option value of waiting and make a postpone-
ment of job creation more likely. Thus, the adverse impact of exchange rate uncertainty on 
job creation and employment should be stronger if the labor market is characterized by gener-
ous unemployment benefit systems, powerful trade unions, minimum wage restrictions or 
large hiring costs. That such features of the labor market are detrimental to employment is of 
course not surprising. The adverse impact of these features on employment has been con-
firmed empirically in various studies, and there are many other theoretical mechanisms ex-
plaining it (see e.g. Nickell 1997 and Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991). What our simple 
model shows is that these features also reinforce the negative employment effects of exchange 
rate uncertainty. 
Another important implication of the model is that only the current, short term uncertainty σ1 
has an impact on the decision to wait. Future uncertainty, represented here by σ2, does not 
enter in the decision under risk neutrality. If one takes a fixed period, e.g. one quarter or one 
year, the likelihood that job creation will be postponed to the end of that period depends only 
on the uncertainty during that period and not on future uncertainty. This implies that even 
short spikes in uncertainty as, e.g., grasped by a contemporaneous uncertainty proxy in em-
pirical investigations of the real option effect detected above, can have a strong impact on 
employment.  
In the following, we consider the scenario of a labor market in which the firm and the worker 
can sign a contract only for one period and keep the option to terminate the work relationship 
whenever it becomes unprofitable. In period 1, the conditionally expected surplus of job con-
tinuation is π+e1 which is positive whenever e1>−π. Hence, whenever uncertainty is large 
enough (σ1>π), there is job destruction in period 1 with probability (σ1−π)/(2σ1). The (uncon-
ditional) expected net return to the firm from a job created in period zero (and with the option 
of destruction in period one) is therefore 
(7) E0(Π0) = [(1−β)π − c] + [(σ1 – π)/2σ1]0 + [(σ1 + π)/2σ1](1−β)[π + (σ1 – π)/2)] , 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
17 The other (smaller) solution to this equation is less than |b| and is therefore not feasible.  
where the first term is the expected return from the job in period one, whereas the second and 
third term represent the expected surplus from the job in period two (after destruction or after 
continuation in period one) under the assumption σ1>π. If σ1<π, the job would never be de-
stroyed, and the expected net return is, as before, 2(1 β)π c − − . Hence, after rearranging (7), 
the expected net return from a job created in period zero can be written 




2(1 β)π c,i fσπ ,
(1 β) π (σπ )/ ( 4 σ )c , i f σπ .
−− <  
 −+ + − ≥  
On the other hand, if the firm waits until period one, the (unconditional) expected net return 
is, as before,  




max(0,(1 β)π c) , if σ |π c/(1 β)| ,
(1 β)(σπ c/(1 β)) /(4σ ),i fσ |π c/(1 β)|
−− < −− 

−+ − − ≥ − − 
It is now easy to see that the firm never delays job creation. First, if σ1 |π c/(1 β)| ≤ −−
σ1 ≥
<π, the 
firm never destroys a job in period one, and so we have E0(Π0)>E0(Π1). Second, if  , the 
condition E
π




which turns out to be equivalent to (2(1−β)π−c)(c/(1−β)+2σ1)>0 and which is satisfied be-
cause of our assumption 2(1−β)π−c>0. Hence, the firm does not delay job creation also in this 
case. Finally, if π−c/(1−β)< σ1< π, the condition E0(Π0)>E0(Π1) means that  
4σ1(2(1−β)π−c) − (1−β)(σ1+π−c/(1−β))
2 > 0 . 
But since this inequality is satisfied at the boundaries σ1=π and σ1=π−c/(1−β)and since the 
left hand side is a concave function of σ1, the inequality is also satisfied in the interval 
π−c/(1−β)< σ1< π. Hence, firms always prefer to create a job in period zero, and so ex-
change rate uncertainty has no impact on job creation. 
However, since there is job destruction with probability (σ1−π)/(2σ1) (whenever σ1>π), the 
probability of job destruction is increasing in uncertainty. Hence, there is also a negative im-
pact of exchange rate uncertainty on employment in this case. Moreover, this effect is more 
pronounced if the worker’s fallback wage is higher (if π is smaller). Therefore, the basic con-
clusions of our basic model remain valid. 
Our crude model has abstracted from risk aversion. However, we would argue that the basic 
conclusion that even a temporary increase in uncertainty can make a postponement of job  
creation optimal does not change is robust because a prolonged period of high uncertainty 
means that expected returns beyond the next period would be discounted more heavily. More-
over, the additional impact of risk aversion on job creation should be stronger under the real-
istic assumption that firms bear all the exchange rate risk. 
In sum, we retain two conclusions from the model. First, even a temporary 'spike' in exchange 
rate variability can induce firms to wait with their creation of jobs (of course and for exactly 
this reason, the level of the exchange rate at the same time loses explanatory power). Second, 
the relationship between exchange rate variability and (un-) employment should be particu-
larly strong if the labor market is characterized by rigidities that improve the bargaining posi-
tion of workers. A stronger fallback position of workers raises the contract wage, lowers the 
net returns to firms and induces firms to delay job creation in the face of uncertainty. 
Our argument rests on the assumption that workers cannot be fired immediately if the ex-
change rate turns out to be unfavorable. Hence, sunk wage payments are associated with the 
decision to hire a worker. These sunk costs and, consequently, the impact of uncertainty on 
job creation become more important if there are high firing costs. However, as we argued 
above, even if there are no firing costs and if workers can be laid off at any point in time, ex-
change rate uncertainty should have a direct impact on job destruction. A more elaborate labor 
market model of job creation and job destruction (e.g., following the model of Pissarides 
2000, Chapter 3) might further clarify these issues, but we would expect that uncertainty has a 
negative effect on both job creation and destruction flows. In the empirical analysis, we there-
fore prefer to employ aggregate labor market indicators rather than more disaggregate job 
flow data.
18 
Interest rate volatility should have a similar effect as exchange rate volatility in the context of 
our model. A weaker domestic exchange rate increases the profits of an exporter (or the prof-
its on domestic sales for producers competing with imports). Lower interest rates have the 
same effect, for all types of producers (as all production involves some investment). Uncer-
tainty about future interest rates will be particularly important for longer term investments in 
the Mercosur countries in which long-term financing was simply not available during dec-
ades, thus forcing producers to rely on rolling over short term credits over long time periods. 
                                                           
18 Klein, Schuh and Triest (2000) investigate the impact of exchange rate movements on job flows in the US. 
They find a response of job destruction to dollar appreciation, whereas job creation does not respond signifi-
cantly to depreciations. This result reflects the asymmetric responses of job creation and destruction to aggregate 
shocks that have been detected in other studies. It does not contradict our conclusions, however, since job crea-
tion might just respond to exchange rate volatility rather than to actual appreciations or depreciations.  
After having modeled the impact of return uncertainty on employment and investment deci-
sions, we now ask whether exchange rate and interest rate volatility (including a G-3 indicator 
variable like the volatility of the nominal and real euro-dollar exchange rate) have any ability 
to explain the residuals of fundamental investment and (un-) employment regressions for 
Mercosur economies. Up to now, the amount of literature which examines the link between 
exchange rate variability and the real sector in emerging markets is rather thin. Hence, we feel 
legitimized to present and comment some first results. 
4. Empirical  analysis 
Having established that the Mercosur is not like the EU in several respects which are relevant 
for the issue of monetary integration, we now proceed to the second practical issue: How 
should one measure exchange rate and interest rate variability? Let us first define our meas-
ures of exchange rate and interest rate variability relevant for Mercosur countries. We used a 
very simple measure: for each year of our total sample from 1970 to 2001 we calculated a 
standard deviation of the basis of twelve monthly observations of the first difference of the 
respective exchange rate and interest rate measure. To take the closer ties to the EU than to 
the U.S. as a special pattern of Mercosur foreign trade relationships into account (see chapter 
2), we also include the volatilities of the euro exchange rates of the Argentinean peso, of the 
Brazilian real, and of the Uruguayan peso. However, extra calculations show that the correla-
tion between dollar and euro volatilities of the respective home currencies amount to close to 
99 percent for Argentina and Brazil, as could have been expected. Finally, we include nomi-
nal and real euro-dollar exchange rate volatility in order to test whether there are real impacts 
of G-3 exchange rate volatilities in Mercosur countries (as projected by Reinhart and Reinhart 
2001).  
At this stage, it is useful to illustrate the exact definitions of the exchange rate and interest vola-
tility variables taking the example of Argentina. Here, we consider the volatility of the nominal 
and real exchange rate vis-à-vis the US-dollar VOLNER_ARPUSD and VOLRER_ARPUSD, of 
the nominal and real exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro VOLNER_ARPEUR and 
VOLRER_ARPEUR, of the nominal and real dollar-exchange rate of the euro 
VOLNER_USDEUR and VOLRER_USDEUR, of the real effective rate VOLREER_ARG, and 
of the nominal and real effective intra-Mercosur exchange rate VOLNEERINTRAMERC_ARG 
and VOLREERINTRAMERC_ARG. The volatility of the nominal short-term interest rate is  
called INTEREST_ARG, the one of real interest rate volatility REALINTEREST_ARG.
19 For 
more details concerning the construction of our volatility measures see the annexes A1 to A3.  
In this section we present and comment the results of first tests of the importance of our array 
of measures of exchange rate variability and our two measures of interest rate volatility 
(nominal and real interest rate variability VOLINTEREST and VOLREALINTEREST) on 
two measures of labor market performance (changes in the unemployment rate 
DUNEMPRATE, employment growth EMPGROWTH) and one measure for investment 
(change in real gross fixed capital formation GROWTHREALINVEST) in the Mercosur 
countries. To start with a summary: exchange rate variability and interest rate variability enter 
most of the equations with the expected sign and are in most of the cases statistically signifi-
cant. The empirical problem tackled in this chapter is visualized in Figure 3 below, based on 
the example of the respective real dollar exchange rate and real interest rate variability as de-
terminants employment in Argentina and in Brazil. The hypothesis tested is that there is a 
significant impact of the variable represented by the dotted line on the variable plotted by the 
uninterrupted line. 
                                                           
19 We used money market rates as a proxy for the short-term interest rate in the cases of Brazil and the euro zone. 
For the U.S., we focus on the treasury bill rate. However, for Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, we preferred the 
deposit rate because this enables us to use a by far larger data set (starting in march 1977 instead of March 1979 
in the case of Argentina, in November 1992 instead of July 1999 in the case of Paraguay, and in July 1976 in-
stead of December 1991 in the case of Uruguay).  
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Note: Data are normalized for illustration purposes. For data sources see annex A5. 
4.1 Methodology 
Before commenting the individual results we need to explain our methodology. In cases of 
doubt we always preferred taking differences since the disadvantages of differencing when it 
is not needed appear to us much less severe than those of failing to difference when it is ap-
propriate. In the first case the worst outcome would be that the disturbances are moving aver-
age, but the estimators would still be consistent, whereas in the second case the usual proper-
ties of the OLS test statistics would be invalidated. All macroeconomic time series and the 
exchange rate data we use are listed in detail in the annex A5. 
As a first step we present the results of some simple tests. We explain the first difference of 
the unemployment rate and employment growth by their own past and lags of our measures of 
exchange rate variability and interest rate variability. The results which are summarized below  
in the Tables 3a and 3b are thus based on standard causality tests on the annual data used 
throughout this paper. The Tables 3a and 3b just summarize the regression results from bivari-
ate VARs on annual data (1970-2001, sometimes shorter periods had to be used subject to data 
availability).
20 The hypothesis tested is, as usual, that exchange rate variability and interest 
variability do not have an influence on the real economy variables investigated here.
21 All the 
results presented here are implicitly based on a comparison of two regression equations, ex-
emplified here with respect to the impact of exchange rate variability on unemployment. The 
notations are chosen for consistency reasons (for a similar procedure see Belke and Gros 2001 
and 2002):  
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where DUEt stands for change in the unemployment rate (between period t and t-1), EXVt-i 
specifies the level of exchange rate variability (between period t-i and period t-i-1), ut repre-
sents the usual i.i.d. error term and N is the maximum number of considered lags (here: 2 
lags). Exchange rate variability (measured by one of the indicators as explained above) can 
then be said to "cause" unemployment if at least one ß, i.e. one of the coefficients on the past 
and contemporaneous level of exchange rate variability, is significantly different from zero. In 
other words, these tests measure the impact of exchange rate variability on changes in na-
tional unemployment rates once the autonomous movements in unemployment have been 
taken into account by including lagged unemployment rates among the explanatory variables. 
Thus, a significant effect (of whatever sign) implies that one can reject the hypothesis that 
(the change in) exchange rate variability does not influence unemployment at the usual confi-
dence levels. In order to be allowed to use the standard t-distribution for the purpose of model 
selection one has to use changes at least in the unemployment rate as the level of this variable 
is clearly non-stationary. Substituting the unemployment rate by the change in employment or 
                                                           
20 The individual regression results are as the ADF-test results for the variables used available on request. 
21 We thus use VARs in first differences of the respective real variables. Since we classify all real variables as 
integrated of order one we feel justified to deviate from the usual specification of an Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test (including a drift term) only by neglecting the (insignificant) lagged endogenous level variable. The signifi-
cance of the coefficient estimates of the lags of the changes in the real variables and of the indicator of exchange  
in investment in the above setting describes our proceedings in the case of employment and 
investment instead of unemployment. The same is valid if we insert measures of interest rate 
volatility instead of exchange rate volatility. 
The Tables 3a and 3b show the results for Argentina and Brazil, using the eleven different 
volatility measures and the three real economy variables. In view of the analysis in Belke and 
Gros (2002a), we prefer to emphasize the results gained for the limited samples case.
22 The 
results based on full samples estimates for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay can be found in the 
Annex A4. For each of the real sector variables mentioned we first used as explanatory vari-
ables only their own past and lags of the exchange rate and interest rate variability measures. 
Hence, each table contains 33 (= 11 times 3) entries by construction. The results reported in 
the first row of Table 3a, for example, imply that exchange rate variability, as measured by 
the standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate of the peso against the US-dollar, has a 
significant impact on labor markets and investment in Argentina. 
As exchange rate variability could be either caused by, or stand for some other macroeco-
nomic variables we also performed a series of robustness tests by adding  
•  the (first difference of the) level of the respective definition of the exchange rate, and 
•  the (first difference of the) real short term interest rate. 
Only the coefficient estimate, its significance level and the lag order of exchange rate variabil-
ity are displayed in the summary tables. The numbers in parentheses correspond to the lag or-
der of exchange rate variability. If the impact effect is for example estimated to be lagged two 
years, this might indicate inflexibilities in the respective national labor market. According to 
our model, the expected sign of exchange rate and interest rate variability is positive for (the 
changes in) the unemployment rate and negative for (the changes in) employment and in-
vestment. 
The specification of the underlying equations is based on the usual diagnostics combined with 
the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SCH). The latter is chosen as our primary model 
selection criterion since it asymptotically leads to the correct model choice (if the true model 
is among the models under investigation, Lütkepohl 1991). The regression which reveals the 
lowest SCH value and at the same time fulfills the usual diagnostic residual criteria is cho-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
rate variability can then be judged on the basis of the usual standard normal respectively the asymptotic values of 
the student-t-distribution. See Belke and Gros (2001, 2002) and Haldrup (1990), pp. 31 f. 
22 By this, we operationalize Argentina’s transition from different attempts to fix or to control the exchange rate 
(Alfonsín and Menem) to the convertibility plan. In the case of Brazil, we introduced a sample split for the year 
1994 (real plan). For Paraguay, reliable data were only available from 1990 on, i.e., after the transition to flexible 
exchange rates. For Uruguay, no sample split seems to be indicated according to our above considerations.  
sen.
23 As already stated above, the sample has been chosen to be 1970 to 2001. However, in 
the case of Argentina it is limited in order to exclude its currency board period. The inclusion 
of the latter would have introduced structural breaks in the relationships because the correla-
tion between exchange rate volatility as a variable that does not move and a real sector vari-
able is nil per se. This procedure is exactly the same for each country. We never intervene to 
exercise a discretionary judgment. As usual, we add country specific dummies from time to 
time in order to account for possible breaks in the VAR relations. These dummies are added 
only if they improve the SCH statistics (higher informational contents even if a penalty for the 
extra dummy is taken into account) and do not lead to a rejection of the normality assumption 
of the residuals (Jarque and Bera 1987). At the same time they should contribute to fulfill the 
criteria on the residuals, especially those on normality. However, none of our results is due to 
the implementation of these dummies. Most of the dummies were also economically mean-
ingful (relating to episodes emphasized by Díaz-Bonilla and Schamis 2001) and mostly dis-
appeared when policy variables were introduced in the robustness tests below. 
4.2 Summary of results 
The results have to be read off the Tables 3a and 3b below as follows. In these tables, point 
estimates for the impact of exchange rate volatility and interest rate volatility are displayed 
together with their significance levels. For Argentina (Table 3a), the point estimate obtained 
from the first specification implies that a decrease of one percentage point in the variability 
(standard deviation) of the nominal bilateral exchange rate of the peso vis-a-vis the US-dollar 
is associated during the same year with a decrease in the unemployment rate of 0.06 percent-
age points. This is economically not significant, but it is not surprising that the effect during 
the same year is small. A jump in exchange rate variability from the average (9%) to zero, e.g. 
through the currency board, would yield in the same year already a more perceptible 0.5%. 
We will comment only briefly on the impact coefficients because the longer run effects de-
pend of course on the dynamic behavior of the variables (Belke and Gros 2001 and 2002). 
Only the results of the best, basic specification are displayed.  
                                                           
23 However, one important precondition for their application is the same number of observations for the alterna-
tive specifications. See Banerjee et al. (1993), p. 286, Mills (1990), p. 139, and Schwarz (1978).  
Table 3a: Regression results for Argentina (until 1990) 
 
DUNEMPRATE_ARG DEMPRATE_ARG GROWTH 
REALINVEST_ARG
VOLNER_ARPUSD    0.06*** (0)    -0.02** (-1)    -0.44* (0) 
VOLRER_ARPUSD    0.07*** (0)    -0.03*** (-1)    -0.51* (0) 
VOLNER_ARPEUR    0.04** (0)    -0.02** (-1)    -0.65** (0) 
VOLRER_ARPEUR    0.05* (0)    -0.03** (-1)    -0.78** (0) 
VOLNER_USDEUR    1.38*** (0)    -0.52*** (-1)    -11.33** (0) 
VOLRER_USDEUR    1.41*** (0)    -0.53*** (-1)    -10.57* (0) 
VOLREER_ARG    0.05* (0)    -0.03** (-1)    -0.80** (0) 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_ARG    0.06*** (0)    -0.02** (-1)    -0.44* (0) 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_ARG    0.07*** (0)    -0.03*** (-1)    -0.48* (0) 
VOLINTEREST_ARG    0.01*** (0)    -0.003* (-1)    -0.11*** (0) 
VOLREALINTEREST_ARG    0.01*** (0)    -0.003* (-1)    -0.10*** (0) 
Note:   Point estimates for the impact of exchange rate volatility are displayed together with their significance 
levels (***: 1 %; **: 5 %; *: 10 %). Numbers in brackets refer to the lags of the implemented volatility 
variable. 
The first upper right hand entry in Table 3a comes from a standard causality type regression 
whose results are reproduced in detail below in Table 4 in order to give a concrete example. 
This entry refers to the impact of the variability of the nominal bilateral exchange rate vis-à-
vis the US-dollar on Argentina’s labor markets. The dependent variable in this case is repre-
sented by the change in the unemployment rate (DUNEMPRATE_ARG). The depicted speci-
fication of the regression equation leads to the ‘best’ result in terms of the (lowest realization 
of the) Schwarz criterion, samples being the same throughout. The dummies for the years 
1974 and 1975 approximate the stimulative fiscal and monetary policies with which the gov-
ernment under Isabel Peron tried to rekindle economic growth (Díaz-Bonilla and Schamis 
(2001), pp. 76 f.).  
Table 3b: Regression results for Brazil (until 1993) 
 DUNEMPRATE_BRA GROWTHEMP_BRA GROWTH 
REALINVEST_BRA
VOLNER_BRRUSD    0.11* (-1)    -0.50*** (-1)    -2.03*** (-1) 
VOLRER_BRRUSD    0.28*** (0)    -0.92*** (-1)    -4.46*** (0) 
VOLNER_BRREUR    0.12** (-1)    -0.65*** (-2)    -2.19** (-1) 
VOLRER_BRREUR    0.26* (0)    -0.82* (-1)    -5.59*** (-0) 
VOLNER_USDEUR   /    -1.78**  (-2)    / 
VOLRER_USDEUR   /    -1.93**  (-2)    / 
VOLREER_BRA   0.28*  (0) 
 0.39*  (-2)   -1.37***  (-1)   -7.13***  (0) 
 -4.50*  (-2) 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_BRA    0.04* (-1)    -0.13*** (-2)    -0.72*** (-1) 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_BRA    0.05** (-1)    -0.12* (-2)    -0.87*** (-1) 
VOLINTEREST_BRA    /    -0.03** (-1)    -0.16** (-1) 
VOLREALINTEREST_BRA    /    -0.03** (-1)    -0.13** (-1) 
Note:   Point estimates for the impact of exchange rate volatility are displayed together with their significance 
levels (***: 1 %; **: 5 %; *: 10 %). Numbers in brackets refer to the lags of the implemented volatility 
variable. / means ‘not significant’. 
Let us now interpret the results summarized in the Tables 3a and 3b above, starting with Ar-
gentina, then commenting the results for Brazil and finally concluding with some general re-
marks. For Argentina we focus on the results up to 1990, i.e. the inauguration of the currency 
board regime. It is apparent that one could no longer expect exchange rate variability to have 
any influence on macroeconomic variables after the installation of the currency board.
24 Ta-
bles 3a and 3b above show that all the different volatility variables (whether they are based on 
exchange rates or interest rates) have a significant influence on labor markets and investment 
and that in all the cases the sign is the expected one (negative for employment and investment 
and positive for unemployment. Table A4 in the annex shows the results for the full sample, 
including the currency board period, 1991 to 2001. It is also interesting to note that the effect 
                                                           
24 For Argentina significant estimates only result if the nineties are excluded from the sample (see annex). Even 
experimenting with a dummy for the currency board period did not help in this respect. In addition, it turned out 
that the implementation of a dummy for 1990 would have had a strong inadequate impact on the results.  
of both exchange rate and interest rate volatility are contemporaneous for unemployment and 
investment, but lagged one period in all cases for employment. This might be due to the fact 
that in times of increased uncertainty individuals might try to enter the labor market as an 
insurance (to be able earn an additional wage or at least to collect unemployment benefits in 
case other members of the household are fired). Firms can also stop first investing in machin-
ery (investment) and the workforce (no new hiring) immediately. However, they might take 
some time to see how things work out before they actually start hiring (provided the labor 
market does not allow them quick firing as well). 
Table 4:   Example regression for Argentina: unemployment rate on the variability of the 
nominal bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the US-dollar 
Dependent Variable: DUNEMPRATE_ARG 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1973 1990 
Included observations: 18 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
C -0.214707  0.254948  -0.842163  0.4162 
DUNEMPRATE_ARG(-1) -0.565809 0.174110  -3.249719 0.0070 
DUNEMPRATE_ARG(-2) -0.251537 0.151962  -1.655258 0.1238 
D74 -3.328228  0.821639  -4.050718  0.0016 
D75 -3.953302  0.974150  -4.058207  0.0016 
VOLNER_ARPUSD  0.060749  0.016028 3.790162  0.0026 
        
R-squared  0.743486      Mean dependent var  0.038889 
Adjusted R-squared  0.636606      S.D. dependent var  1.259850 
S.E. of regression  0.759465      Akaike info criterion  2.548798 
Sum squared resid  6.921453      Schwarz criterion  2.845588 
Log likelihood  -16.93918      F-statistic  6.956224 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.708864      Prob(F-statistic)  0.002880 
Note: D74 and D75 are ‘Peron’-Dummies defined in the text. 
Concerning individual volatility measures it is apparent that real and nominal measures have 
usually the same point estimates and significance levels. This is not surprising in view of the 
fact that in the very short run (monthly data for the volatility measures) changes in nominal 
and real exchange rates are highly correlated (but not exactly the same, as documented in 
Belke and Gros 2002a). It is also not surprising that the dollar/euro exchange rate variability 
has a larger point estimate than that of the volatility of the national exchange rate against the 
dollar because the former is much less variable than the latter.  
For Brazil we obtain a similar pattern as for Argentina: the results are much stronger when we 
limit the sample to the period before the real plan, i.e. up to 1993.
25 For this sample period we 
find again that all the significant coefficients have the expected sign, and seem to act with a 
lag of one or two years. The latter can serve as a first hint in favor of exogeneity of the 
volatility variables with respect to the real sector variables (Belke and Gros 2001). As a 
striking fact, the lag structure is exactly the same for the unemployment rate and growth of 
real investment. We would give the same interpretation as above: the unemployment rate and 
investment can react more quickly because in times of increased uncertainty it is easier to stop 
immediately new hiring and investment projects. The main difference with respect to Argen-
tina is that the dollar/euro exchange rate does not seem to be as important and interest rate 
volatility is not always significant. The former might be due to the difference in the geo-
graphical distribution of exports (Belke and Gros 2002a). Moreover, this exactly mirrors the 
empirical evidence delivered by Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) that only the volatility of the 
own currency should matter (see chapter 3.1). The latter might be caused by the widespread 
use of indexation clauses in Brazil prior to the real plan period. The point estimates are gener-
ally higher for Brazil. This might be caused by the fact that the volatilities for Argentina are 
higher than those for Brazil (see Belke and Gros 2002a, chapter 3). The latter implies firms 
have adapted to this environment, implying that impact of observed changes in exchange rate 
variability might be lower. 
Let us now turn to some more general issues. There is practically no difference between the 
results using the volatility of the national currency against the US dollar or against the euro. 
This was to be expected as the average volatility of the dollar/euro rate VOLRER_USDEUR 
is at 2.37 % (sample 1978 to 1990) so much lower than, for example, the average volatility of 
the Argentinean currency (or rather currencies) in real terms against either of these two major 
currencies, e.g., against the euro VOLRER_ARPEUR which amounts to 9.63% (sample 1979 
to 1990). For the reasons already alluded to in Belke and Gros (2002a), interest and exchange 
rate volatility are highly correlated (in the case of Argentina in particular). Hence, it is not 
surprising that the two yield not too different results, at least with respect to the sign and the 
significance levels. 
The results are generally weaker for unemployment than for employment. This suggests that 
movements in and out of the labor force dominate over flows into and out of unemployment 
in the adjustment of the labor market. This is a quite typical finding for Latin America (see 
                                                           
25 The results for Brazil (full sample) and for Uruguay (full sample) are displayed in the annex (Tab. A2 and  
chapter 3.1). The significance of entry into and exit from the labor force is clearly supported 
by our model developed in chapter 3.2. Let us now finally turn to some robustness tests of the 
empirical results gained so far. 
5. Robustness tests 
5.1 Missing variables? 
The purpose of the following is to report the results of some tests for the robustness of the 
relationships found so far. We try to take into account the two most plausible ways in which 
our measures of exchange rate and interest rate variability could stand for some other variable. 
For each hypothesis we then implement the same procedure based on the SCH criterion ex-
plained above.  
The two hypotheses we consider are: 
i) Exchange rate variability is just a sign of a misalignment (i.e. a wrong level of the exchange 
rate). 
ii) Interest rate variability just reflects the financial stress defined as high real (short-term) 
interest rates.  
ad i) A first possible reason for the significant correlation of exchange rate variability with 
(un-) employment and investment might be that this volatility just stands for misalignments of 
the real exchange rate. The sign of the correlation, negative for employment (positive for un-
employment) makes it a priori unlikely that exchange rate variability just stands for a mis-
aligned exchange rate because Mercosur currencies were usually variable when they were 
very weak. But this argument needs to be addressed because it represents a possible explana-
tion for the results we obtain if devaluations are contractionary as claimed for some. 
ad ii) Interest rate variability could also just be the result of a tight monetary policy. The hy-
pothesis is that this policy leads to employment losses in the short-term, and that this is exclu-
sively assigned to interest rate variability in Tables 3a and 3b. However, this problem of iden-
tification can be reduced by explicitly adding a variable that indicates the degree of tightness 
to the equation. We use the (real) interest rate as a first indicator. This control variable actu-
ally improves the performance of the equation overall.
26 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
A3). 
26 Space and time constraints did not allow us to pursue other combinations, e.g., 1) both intra- and extra-
Mercosur exchange rate variability on the one hand and interest rate changes on the other hand, 2) or interest rate 
variability on the one hand and exchange rate changes on the other hand.  
In order to take these hypotheses into account, we added the first difference (the level is not 
stationary) of the exchange rate in the regressions displayed in the Tables 5a and 5b, if the 
implemented volatility measure is one for exchange rate variability. In contrast, if an interest 
rate volatility measure enters the regression equation, the change in the respective interest rate 
(again, the level is non-stationary) is inserted as a control variable. Hence, in order to check 
for robustness, we augment the regression equations which are underlying the results depicted 
in Tables 3a and 3b (we use the same sample period to conceive comparability) with an addi-
tional regressor which in each case is the variable for which the respective volatility measure 
is calculated. For example, in row one of Table 3a we add the change in the nominal dollar 
exchange rate of the Argentinean peso and get the first row of Table 5a. By this, we secure 
overall consistency of our procedure. 
Table 5a: Robustness regression results for Argentina (until 1990) 
 DUNEMPRATE_ARG  DEMPRATE_ARG  GROWTH 
REALINVEST_ARG 
VOLNER_ARPUSD   0.11***  (0) 
 -0.006**  (-1) 
 -0.02***  (-1) 
 0.006***  (-2) 
 -0.46*  (0) 
 / 
VOLRER_ARPUSD   0.06***  (0) 
 0.01**  (-2) 
 -0.02**  (-1) 
 -0.007*  (-2) 
 -0.50*  (0) 
 / 
VOLNER_ARPEUR   0.04**  (0) 
 / 
 -0.02*  (-1) 
 0.004*  (-2) 
 -0.61*  (-1) 
 / 
VOLRER_ARPEUR   0.05*  (0) 
 0.02*  (-2) 
 -0.02*  (-1) 
 -0.007*  (-2) 
 -0.70**  (0) 
 -0.21**  (-1) 
VOLNER_USDEUR   1.38***  (0) 
 -0.01*  (0) 
 -0.70**  (-1) 
 / 
 -13.80*  (0) 
 / 
VOLRER_USDEUR   1.45***  (0) 
 0.01*  (0) 
 -0.66**  (-1) 
 / 
 -13.15*  (-1) 
 / 
VOLREER_ARG   0.04*  (0) 
 0.03**  (-2) 
 -0.03*  (-1) 
 / 
 -0.75**  (0) 
 -0.20**  (-1) 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_ARG   / 
 -0.01***  (-2) 
 / 
 0.04**  (-2) 
 / 
 / 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_ARG   0.06***(0) 
 0.02***  (-2) 
 -0.03**  (-1) 
 -0.007*  (-2) 
 / 
 / 




 -0.10***  (0) 
 -0.06**  (-1) 




 -0.10***  (0) 
 -0.06***  (-1) 
Note:   The first numbers displayed are the point estimates for the impact of exchange rate volatility. The sec-
ond numbers refer to the respective robustness variable. The respective significance levels are attached 
to the point estimates (***: 1 %; **: 5 %; *: 10 %; -: not significant). Numbers in brackets in each case 
refer to the lags of the implemented volatility variable. Regression equations include the respective ro-
bustness variable. / means ‘not significant’.  
In contrast to the Tables 3a and 3b, point estimates are now displayed for the impact of exchange 
rate volatility and for the additional robustness variable together with their significance levels. 
Interpreting Tables 5a and 5b, one has to keep in mind that an increasing nominal (real) ex-
change rate index means a nominal (real) devaluation (appreciation) of the home currency (see 
annex). The results suggest that the above mentioned hypotheses that variability just stands for 
a wrong level do not hold a lot of explanatory power as the addition of the change in the ex-
change rate does in only few cases like sometimes for intra-Mercosur exchange rate volatility 
change the magnitude or significance level of the coefficient of exchange rate variability. The 
argument that a high degree of variability stands for the ‘wrong’ level does not really make 
sense if one looks at the dollar/euro rate. We have tabulated the results, but they are more dif-
ficult to interpret since it is not clear a priori whether a strong dollar is good or bad for Mer-
cosur exports (since the shares of the US and the EU are not that different). 
Table 5b: Robustness regression results for Brazil (until 1993) 
 DUNEMPRATE_BRA  GROWTHEMP_BRA  GROWTH 
REALINVEST_BRA 
VOLNER_BRRUSD    0.16*** (-1)   
 -0.006**  (-1) 
 -0.66***  (-1) 
 0.01*  (-2) 
 -1.89**  (-1) 
 / 
VOLRER_BRRUSD   0.24**  (0) 
 -0.02*  (-1) 
 -0.67***  (-1) 
 -0.10**  (-2) 
 -4.73***  (0) 
 -0.53***  (0) 
VOLNER_BRREUR   0.17**  (-1) 
 -0.009**  (-1) 
 -0.64***  (-2) 
 / 
 -2.71**  (-1) 
 / 
VOLRER_BRREUR   0.65**  (0) 
  -0.06* (-1) 
 -0.88*  (-1) 
 / 
 -5.86***  (0) 
 -0.43**  (0) 
VOLNER_USDEUR   / 
 / 




VOLRER_USDEUR   / 
 0.05***  (-2) 




VOLREER_BRA   / 
 0.04***  (-2) 
 -1.44***  (-1) 
 / 
 -4.60**  (-2) 
 -0.70***  (-1) 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_BRA   0.04*  (-1) 
 / 
 -0.14***  (-2) 
 - 
 -0.63***  (-1) 
 +0.07**  (-2) 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_BRA   0.05**  (-1) 
 / 
 -0.12*  (-2) 
 / 
 -0.87***  (-1) 
 / 
VOLINTEREST_BRA   / 
 / 
 -0.03**  (-1) 
 -0.009**  (-1) 
 -0.14**  (-1) 
 -0.05**  (-1) 
VOLREALINTEREST_BRA   / 
 / 
 -0.03**  (-1) 
 -0.01**  (-1) 
 -0.13**  (-1) 
 -0.06**  (-1) 
Note:   The first numbers displayed are the point estimates for the impact of exchange rate volatility. The sec-
ond numbers refer to the respective robustness variable. The respective significance levels are attached 
to the point estimates (***: 1 %; **: 5 %; *: 10 %; -: not significant). Numbers in brackets in each case 
refer to the lags of the implemented volatility variable. Regression equations include the respective ro-
bustness variable. / means ‘not significant’.  
As expected, adding the real short term interest rate to the equation does in some cases change 
the results in the sense that the coefficient on interest rate variability does not remain significant. 
Nevertheless, for Argentina, we still find that in the four equations regarding unemployment and 
investment interest rate variability remains significant and enters with the expected sign. For 
Brazil there are, however, more entries in the employment and investment columns.  
Our main focus is on the importance of volatility; we are thus not particularly interested in the 
size of the additional variables introduced to test for robustness. However, it is interesting to ob-
serve that for Mercosur countries a devaluation has a in most cases positive impact on the econ-
omy. The only exceptions are the two results gained for the impact of the real exchange rate of 
the Brazilian real against the dollar and against the euro on the change in the Brazilian unem-
ployment rate. The point estimates of the parameters are usually somewhat smaller for the ro-
bustness variable (the first moment) than for the second moment. 
In chapter 2, we have shown that both for Argentina and Brazil the EU is the more important 
trade partner than the NAFTA. This relation is even more pronounced for Argentina. However, 
we do not find that exchange rate variability vis-à-vis the euro is more important than that vis-à-
vis the dollar, as the point estimates are in most cases virtually undistinguishable.  
5.2 Exogeneity of volatility variables? 
Reverse causation and missing third variables are possible objections against the simple test 
results presented so far. Whenever exchange rate variability influences real variables with a 
lag, reverse causation appears less plausible. But even in cases of a contemporaneous rela-
tionship reverse causation appears not to be a problem as suggested by additional pairwise 
Granger causality tests which are applied to exchange rate and interest rate variability and the 
real sector variables used in this contribution. Hence, the Tables A4 and A5 in the annex each 
display the results from (11 volatility variables times 3 real sector variables =) 33 pairwise 
Granger causality tests. 
For the data for Argentina and Brazil we are not forced to reject the hypothesis that the real 
sector variables do not Granger cause our volatility measures in 63 out of 66 cases. However, 
based on our estimates displayed in Tables 3a, 3b, 5a and 5b we do in the overwhelming ma-
jority of cases reject the hypothesis that our volatility measures do not “cause” the three real 
sector variables. Therefore it appears that “causality” runs from volatility to the real sector. 
However, there are even some additional arguments which speak in favor of our exogeneity 
hypothesis for the volatility variables. We are skeptical in general about the possibility that  
exchange rate and interest rate variability at our high frequency was caused by slow moving 
variables such as labor market rigidities or unemployment and investment. A further argu-
ment validating our methodology and our results comes from the work of Canzoneri, Vallés 
and Viñals (1996) and others who show for a different sample of countries that exchange rates 
reacted mainly to financial shocks rather than real fundamentals. Rose (1995) and Flood and 
Rose (1995) also emphasize that exchange rate volatility is largely noise. It does not make 
much sense to treat a noise series as endogenous.  
5.3 Multicollinearity of volatility and robustness variables? 
Are there problems of multicollinearity, e.g., for interest rate volatility? The Tables 5a and 5b 
suggest some collinearity between the volatility variable and the change in the exchange rate 
or interest rate variable, since the coefficient of the latter is sometimes not significant. There-
fore, one might argue that the issue of reverse causation from real variables to exchange rate 
variability appears to be less of a problem than the possibility that exchange rate volatility 
might itself be affected by the additional regressors considered in the larger VARs introduced 
in this section. To check for robustness we applied pairwise Granger-causality tests to ex-
change rate volatility and the additional explanatory variables. On the whole, these tests (Ta-
bles A6 and A7 in the annex) confirm that our regression results are not spurious.  
Finally, we would like to stress again that one should be very cautious with any far-reaching 
conclusions in view of the weak quality of the labor market data for the Mercosur countries. 
6.   Summary and outlook 
The data from the past investigated by us suggest that exchange rate variability (whether ex-
tra- or intra-Mercosur) and interest rate variability have had a statistically significant negative 
impact on employment, and investment for a number of countries like Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay. We have argued that this result is due to the fact that all employment and invest-
ment decisions have some degree of irreversibility. Our model of the 'option value of waiting' 
also suggests that temporary short-run increases in variability could have a stronger impact 
than permanent ones on decisions that involve sunk costs, such as hiring, firing or investing. 
Our results here confirm earlier results for European countries, which went in the same direc-
tion. The fact that similar results were obtained for other countries as well, renders the limited  
number of observations, which would otherwise constitute a reason to be cautious, less impor-
tant.
27 
We have investigated on both intra- and extra-Mercosur exchange rate variability because the 
geographical distribution of trade is of the countries in question is less concentrated than for 
European countries. We are aware of the general finding in the empirical literature that the 
impact of exchange rate variability on trade is small. However, we do not want, nor need, to 
take a stance on whether the economic impact of exchange rate variability on trade is strong 
or not. We simply argue that exchange rate variability has a stronger impact on investment 
and employment than on current production and exports, because the latter can be adjusted 
with the existing labor through variations in utilization rates. Irreversibility of set-up costs is 
thus not an important consideration for production that can be sold within weeks or days, 
whereas it is crucial for long-run decisions, such as decisions to invest or to hire additional 
workers. 
In general, our results are rather strong in that we find in almost all cases, and despite exten-
sive robustness tests, that exchange rate and interest rate variability has a significant impact 
on investment and employment. Moreover, one would have expected that economies with rela-
tively closer ties to the U.S. like Brazil would show a stronger impact of dollar exchange rate 
variability, a result confirmed by the data. The estimated impact coefficients for Argentina were 
in most of the cases smaller than for Brazil. However, we argued that the 'nature' of exchange 
rate variability is different from pre-EMU Europe and at times much larger. This implies that 
firms have adapted to the environment, implying that the impact of observed changes in ex-
change rate variability might be lower. But we also acknowledge that some aspects of the re-
sults remain unsatisfactory. The prior that intra-Mercosur exchange rate volatility has a higher 
impact on Argentina’s real sector (exports to the Mercosur trade bloc amount to 2.7 percent of 
it’s GDP) than for the Brazilian one (only 0.9 % of GDP go to Mercosur countries) is only 
partially corroborated by the estimations. This is a general feature also of our earlier work in 
the sense that for Europe we also did not find a systematic correlation between openness and 
the strength of the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade. This is the main reason why we 
do not invoke more the general finding of the literature on the impact of exchange rate variabil-
ity on international trade, which is that for LDCs this channel is much more important. 
                                                           
27 However, it might anyway be argued that Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) more 
or less make use of the old and common argument against reducing exchange rate variability that volatility must 
have a valve somewhere else. In other words, could the gains from suppressing exchange rate variability that are 
suggested by our results be lost if the volatility reappear elsewhere, for example in higher interest rate variabil- 
What are the implications of the results for the debate on exchange rate policy in Mercosur and 
on the design of intra-Mercosur monetary relations? By accepting our main result one could 
jump to the policy conclusion that fixing exchange rates either within the Mercosur or against G-
3 currencies should bring about significant benefits. Our estimates are not precise enough to de-
cide which option would yield larger benefits. Whether there are benefits depends essentially on 
whether the gains from suppressing exchange rate variability are lost if the volatility reappears 
elsewhere, for example in a higher dollar variability or higher interest rate variability. Recent 
research (Rose 1995) shows that official action can reduce exchange rate variability even holding 
constant the variability of fundamentals such as interest rates and money. 
We would argue that fixing the exchange rate might be beneficial if the underlying policies are 
compatible with this choice. This is a big if as the experience of Argentina shows if fiscal policy 
is out of control then fixing the exchange rate might just suppress the appearance of the true 
problem temporarily. In the case of Argentina one might even argue that the currency board 
worked too well for too long, thus allowing a considerable dis-equilibrium to accumulate under 
the surface. The explosion that followed in the end then might have such high costs that it can 
easily offset the benefits of a stable exchange rate that were accumulated in the preceding 10 
years. Our analysis is more appropriate for countries and time periods during which there are no 
violent regime shifts. Our results should become relevant again when Mercosur countries will 
have shifted to a 'normal' regime, which has two aspects: first, that movements of the exchange 
rate do not take extreme values because of doubts that the country will go bankrupt or sink into 
anarchy, and, secondly, that any fixing of exchange rates is supported by other policy choices. To 
enforce this, any renewed attempt to fix exchange rates (either within the region or by using an 
external anchor) would have to be accompanied by tight fiscal policy rules.  
In sum, we maintain that the high degree of exchange rate variability observed from time to time 
in Mercosur has tangible economic costs, but that fixing exchange rates was too often considered 
a free lunch by irresponsible politicians. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ity? We would argue that recent research on OECD economies is suggestive in this respect. See Belke and Gros 
(2002a).  
References 
Acemoglu, D. (2000): Credit Market Imperfections and Persistent Unemployment, NBER 
Working Paper no. 7938, Cambridge, MA. 
Aizenman, J. (1994): Monetary and Real Shocks, Productive Capacity and Exchange Rate 
Regimes, in: Economica, Vol. 61, pp. 407-434. 
Aizenman, J., Marion, N.P. (1996): Volatility and the Investment Response, NBER Working 
Paper no. 5841, Cambridge/MA.  
Aizenman, J. Marion, N.P. (1999): Volatility and Investment: Interpreting Evidence from De-
veloping Countries, in: Economica, Vol. 66, pp. 157-179. 
Alesina, A., Barro, R.J. (2001): Dollarization, in: American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings, Vol. 91, pp. 381-385. 
Andersen, T.M., Sorensen, J.R. (1988): Exchange Rate Variability and Wage Formation in 
Open Economies”, Economics Letters Vol. 28, pp. 263-268. 
Banerjee, A. et al. (1993): Co-Integration, Error Correction, and the Econometric Analysis of 
Non-Stationary Data, Oxford. 
Belke, A., Gros, D. (2001): Real Impacts of Intra-European Exchange Rate Variability:  
A Case for EMU?, in: Open Economies Review, Vol. 12, pp. 231-264. 
Belke, A., Gros, D. (2001a): Designing Monetary Relations between the EU and the US: Is 
the Degree of Exchange Rate Variability Relevant?, in: International Review of Com-
parative Public Policy, Special Issue on International Financial Systems and Stock 
Volatility, Vol. 16.  
Belke, A., Gros, D. (2002): Designing EU-US Atlantic Monetary Relations: Exchange Rate 
Variability and Labor Markets, forthcoming in: The World Economy. 
Belke, A., Kaas, L. (2002): The Impact of Exchange Rate Volatility on Labor Markets: Europe 
versus United States, Economics Department Discussion Paper, Vienna University, 
forthcoming. 
Belke, A., Gros, D. (2002a): Monetary Integration in the Southern Cone: Mercosur Is Not 
Like the EU, Paper presented at the Conference ‘Towards Regional Currency Areas’, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago de 
Chile, March 26-27 2002,  
web: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/communications/com2002.htm 
Bonomo, M., Terra, C.T. (2001): The Dilemma of Inflation vs. Balance of Payments - Crawl-
ing Pegs in Brazil, 1964-1998, in: Frieden, J., Stein, E. (2001), The Currency Game - 
Exchange Rate Politics in Latin America, Washington/DC, pp. 119-155. 
Calvo, G.A., Reinhart, C.M. (2000): Fear of Floating, NBER Working Paper no. 7993, Cam-
bridge/MA. 
Calvo, G.A., Reinhart, C.M. (2000a): Fixing for Your Life, NBER Working Paper no. 8006, 
Cambridge/MA. 
Canzoneri, M.B., Vallés, J., Viñals, J. (1996): Do Exchange Rates Move to Address National 
Imbalances?, CEPR Discussion Paper no. 1498, London.  
Center for Global Trade Analysis (2001): GTAP Version 5 Data Base, Purdue University, 
USA.  
Coes, D.V. (1981): The Crawling peg and Exchange Rate Uncertainty, in: Williamson, J. 
(ed.), Exchange Rate Rules - The Theory, Performance and Prospects of the Crawling 
Peg, New York, pp. 113-136. 
Corbo, V. (2001): Is It Time for a Common Currency for the Americas?, in: Journal of Policy 
Modeling, Vol. 23, pp. 241-248. 
Davis, R.R., Weinstein, D.E. (2001): The Factor Content of Trade, NBER Working Paper  
no. 8637, Cambridge/MA. 
Díaz-Bonilla, E., Schamis, H.E. (2001): From Redistribution to Stability: The Evolution of 
Exchange Rate Policies in Argentina, 1950-98, in: Frieden, J., Stein, E. (2001), The 
Currency Game - Exchange Rate Politics in Latin America, Washington/DC,  
pp. 65-118. 
Dixit, A. (1989): Entry and Exit Decisions under Uncertainty, in: Journal of Political Econ-
omy, Vol. 97, pp. 620-638. 
Edwards, E., Cox Edwards, A. (2000): Economic Reforms and Labor Markets: Policy Issues 
and Lessons from Chile, Paper presented at the 29
th Economic Policy Panel, Frankfurt, 
April. 
Edwards, S., Lustig, N. (1997): Labor Markets in Latin America - Combining Social Protec-
tion with Market Flexibility, Brookings Institution. 
Eichengreen, B. (1998): Does the Mercosur Need a Single Currency? Keynote Address for 
the IPEA Conference “ALCA and MERCOSUL - The Brazilian Economy and the Pro-
cess of Subregional and Hemispheric Integration”, Brasilia, October 5-6. 
Financial Times (2001): Mercosur Split Leaves US and EU Worried, FTD April 10
th, 2001,  
p. 7. 
Flood, R.P., Rose, A.K. (1995): Fixing Exchange Rates - A Virtual Quest for Fundamentals, 
in: Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 36, pp. 3-37.  
Frieden, J., Stein, E. (2001): The Currency Game - Exchange Rate Politics in Latin America, 
Washington/DC. 
Galiani, S., Nickell, S. (1998): Unemployment in Argentina in the 19990s, mimeo, Instituto 
Torcuato di Tella. 
Giambiagi (1999): Mercosur - Why Does Monetary Union Make Sense in the Long Term?, 
in: Integration & Trade, Vol. 3, no. 9, September/December. 
Haldrup, N. (1990): Testing for Unit Roots with a Maintained Trend When the True Data 
Generating Process Is a Random Walk with Drift, Institute of Economics Memo  
1990-22, University of Aarhus.  
Heckman, J., Pagés, C. (2000): The Cost of Job Security Regulation: Evidence from Latin 
American Labor Markets, Research Department Working Paper no. 430, Inter-
American Development Bank, Washington/DC. 
Hopenhayn, H.A. (2001): Labor Market Policies and Employment Duration: The Effects of 
Labor Market Reform in Argentina, Research Department Working Paper no. 407, In-
ter-American Development Bank, Washington/DC. 
Jarque, C.M., Bera, A.K. (1987): A Test for Normality of Observations and Regression Re-
siduals, in: International Statistical Review, Vol. 55, pp. 163-172.  
Jeanne, O., Rose, A.K. (1999): Noise Trading and Exchange Rate Regimes, NBER Working 
Paper no. 7104, Cambridge, MA.   
Klein, M.W., Schuh, S., Triest, R.K. (2000): Job Creation, Job Destruction, and the Real Ex-
change Rate, NBER Working Paper no. 7466, Cambridge, MA.  
Krugman, P., Obstfeld, M. (2000): International Economics - Theory and Policy, 5
th ed., Ad-
dison-Wesley, Reading/MA et al. 
Lazear, E. (1990): Job Security Provisions and Employment, in: Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, Vol. 105, pp. 699-726. 
Levy Yeyati, E., Sturzenegger, F. (2000): Is EMU a Blueprint for Mercosur?, in: Cuardernois 
de Economía, Vol. 37, pp. 63-99.  
Loayza, N., Lopez, J.H., Ubide, A. (1999): Sectoral Macroeconomic Interdependencies - Evi-
dence for Latin America, East Asia and Europe, IMF Working Paper No. 99/11. 
Lütkepohl, H. (1991): Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis, New York: Springer. 
Márquez, G., Pagés, C. (1998): Trade and Employment: Evidence from Latin America and 
the Carribean, Inter-American Development Bank, July. 
Márquez, G., Pagés, C. (1998): Ties that Bind: Employment Protection and Labor Market 
Outcomes in Latin America, Research Department Working Paper no. 373, Inter-
American Development Bank, Washington/DC. 
McKinnon, R. (1999): The East Asian Dollar Standard, Life after Death? Paper prepared for 
the World Bank Seminar ‘Rethinking the East Asian Miracle’, July 1999. 
Mills, T.C. (1990): Time Series Techniques for Economists, Cambridge et al.: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Montoya, M.A. (2001): The Insertion of the Brazilian Economy in Mercosur: an Approach by 
Value Added, in: Guilhoto, J.J.M. (ed.), The Political Economy of Latin America,  
pp. 355-377. 
Nickell, S. (1997): Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North Amer-
ica, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, pp. 55-74.  
Paredes, C.E. (1989): Exchange Rate Regimes, the Real Exchange Rate and Export Perform-
ance in Latin America, Brookings Discussion Papers in Economics, No. 77, Washington 
D.C. 
Pissarides, C. (2000): Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2
nd ed., Cambridge/MA. 
Ramey, G., Ramey, V.A. (1995): Cross-Country Evidence on the Link Between Volatility and 
Growth, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 85, pp. 1138-1151. 
Reinhart, C.M., Reinhart, V.R. (2001): What Hurts Most? G-3 Exchange Rate or Interest Rate 
Volatility?, NBER Working Paper no. 8535, Cambridge/MA. 
Rose, A.K. (1996): After the Deluge: Do Fixed Exchange Rates Allow Inter-Temporal 
Volatility Trade-Offs?, in: International Journal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 1,  
pp. 47-54.  
Rose, A.K. (1999): One Money, One Market: Estimating the Effect of Common Currencies on 
Trade, NBER Working Paper no. 7432, Cambridge/MA. 
Rowthorn, R. (1999): Unemployment, Wage Bargaining and Capital-Labour Substitution, in: 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, pp. 413-425. 
Schwarz, G. (1978): Estimating the Dimension of a Model, in: Annals of Statistics, Vol. 6,  
pp. 461-464. 
Sorensen, J.R. (1992): Uncertainty and Monetary Policy in a Wage Bargaining Model, in: 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 94, pp. 443-455.  
Annex 
 
1.   Construction of exchange rate and interest rate variability series 
What kind of exchange rate did we take as the basis for our calculations? To measure volatil-
ity of the Mercosur currencies themselves, we used both the nominal and real bilateral US-
dollar rates and the real effective exchange rates of the Mercosur currencies. Following the 
hypothesis by Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) that it is G-3 volatility which matters for the real 
sector of emerging markets (especially those with a peg to a G-3 currency), we use the nomi-
nal and real bilateral exchange rate of the US-dollar vis-à-vis the euro area (reconstituted for 
the past) and the effective rates of the dollar and the euro. In order to have percentage changes 
we either used directly the first difference of the raw numbers for the exchange rates when 
they are indices, with a base around 100. In the case of the remaining rates we used the first 
difference of the natural logarithm. The historical series of the external effective exchange 
rate of Euroland was taken directly from the official sources, which calculate the average of 
bilateral exchange rates of the 11 present euro countries, with weights given by the non-euro 
trading partners. In order to convey an exact picture of our proceedings, the algorithm for the 
construction of the variability variables (VOL …) is described in the annex as well. 
We use monthly exchange rates to calculate volatility instead of daily (or other higher fre-
quency) volatility because the required data were easier to obtain on a consistent basis for the 
entire sample period. Another reason to prefer this measure over more short-term alternatives 
(e.g., daily variability) was that we are convinced that while the latter might be important for 
financial actors it is less relevant for decisions whether to employ or to invest, which have a 
longer time horizon. The drawback of this decision was that we had to use annual data in or-
der to have a meaningful measure of variability. We thus had only about 31 observations for 
each country, but this turned out to be sufficient. 
In principle one could have used option prices to extract implicit forward looking volatilities, 
but option prices are generally available only for the US dollar and sometimes against the DM 
(the euro), and even then only for limited periods. Hence, it would not have been possible to 
construct a measure of euro volatility on a consistent basis using option prices. We used ac-
tual exchange rate changes instead of only unanticipated ones. But at the monthly horizon the 
anticipated change is usually close to zero. That’s why actual and unanticipated changes 
should give the same results. An advantage of using monthly data is that price indices are 
available on a monthly basis so that one could use real exchange rates. We have preferred to  
start with nominal rates in this first test since over a short-term horizon nominal and real ex-
change rates are usually highly correlated.  
Concerning our measure of interest rate volatility we apply an analogous procedure. In most 
cases (Argentina, and in Belke and Gros 2002a, also for Paraguay and Uruguay) we refer to 
the deposit rate. In the case of Brazil, we use the money market rate; for the euro zone we 
choose the German money market rate until December 1994 and from January on the 3-month 
rate. Finally, the U.S. interest rate is approximated by the treasury bill rate. Real interest rates 
are deflated with the respective consumer price index (see annex). When calculating the rele-
vant volatilities for the euro-dollar relationship, we used the interest rate differential instead of 
the interest rate levels in this case, because it is not ex ante obvious whether, e.g. the U.S. 
interest rate is exogenous to the euro interest rate (as it might be presumed for the U.S. inter-
est rate with respect to, e.g., Argentina). 
It seems important to note that the model for a negative relationship between G-3 exchange 
rate and interest (or monetary aggregate) volatility developed by Reinhart and Reinhart 
(2001), pp. 5 ff. is not exactly based on our measure of volatility. However, their measure is 
closely linked to our than to the first moment of exchange rate and interest rate changes which 
are also often used in this context. The same is valid with respect to Calvo und Reinhart 
(2000), pp. 5 ff. who use annual averages of the absolute value of the monthly change in the 
logarithm of the real exchange rate and of the percentage point change in the real treasury bill 
rate.  
2.   Plot of selected volatility variables 
In the following, some examples of our volatility measures are displayed graphically. 
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 3.   Program to calculate Mercosur exchange rate and interest vari-
ability series 
 
SMPL 1970.1 2001.12 
 
FOR %EX  NER_ARPBRR  NER_ARPEUR  NER_ARPPYG  NER_ARPUSD   NER_ARPUYP 
NER_BRREUR NER_BRRPYG NER_BRRUSD NER_BRRUYP NER_PYGEUR
  NER_PYGUSD  NER_PYGUYP  NER_USDEUR  NER_UYPEUR NER_UYPUSD   
RER_ARPBRR RER_ARPEUR RER_ARPPYG RER_ARPUSD     RER_ARPUYP RER_BRREUR 
RER_BRRPYG RER_BRRUSD RER_BRRUYP RER_PYGEUR RER_PYGUSD
 RER_PYGUYP  RER_USDEUR  RER_UYPEUR  RER_UYPUSD REER_ARG REER_BRA 
REER_EUR REER_PY REER_US REER_UY INTEREST_ARG INTEREST_BRA INTEREST_EUR 
INTEREST_PY INTEREST_US INTEREST_UY  REALINTEREST_ARG 





  GENR VOL%EX = NA 
 
  FOR !1=0 to 372 STEP 12 
 
  SMPL 1970.1+!1 1970.12+!1 
 
  GENR VOL%EX=SQR(@VAR(D(log(%EX))*100)) 
 
  NEXT 
 





FOR %INTEREST  DIFINTEREST_EURUS DIFREALINTEREST_EURUS  
 
  GENR VOL%INTEREST = NA 
 
  FOR !1=0 to 372 STEP 12 
 
  SMPL 1970.1+!1 1970.12+!1 
 
  GENR VOL%INTEREST=SQR(@VAR(D(%INTEREST)/%INTEREST(-1))) 
 
  NEXT 
 
   
 
NEXT  
4.  Regression and Granger causality tests results 
Table A1: Regression results for Argentina (full sample) 
 DUNEMPRATE_ARG DEMPRATE_ARG GROWTHREALINVEST_ARG
VOLNER_ARPUSD /  /  -0.64*** (0) 
+1.14*** (-1) 




VOLNER_ARPEUR /  /  -0.72*** (0) 
1.22*** (-1) 
VOLRER_ARPEUR /  /  -0.86** (0) 
1.49*** (-1) 
VOLNER_USDEUR  1.12*** (0) 
1.02*** (-2)  -0.26* (-1)  -8.97*** (0) 
VOLRER_USDEUR  1.10*** (0) 
1.00** (-2)  -0.27* (-1)  -8.46** (0) 
VOLREER_ARG  /  +0.04* (-2)  -0.80*** (0) 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_ARG /  -0.02* (-1) 
+0.03*** (-2)  -0.45** (0) 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_ARG  /  +0.04*** (-2)  -0.53** (0) 
VOLINTEREST_ARG /  /  -0.18*** (0) 
+0.30*** (-1) 
VOLREALINTEREST_ARG /  /  -0.18*** (0) 
+0.29*** (-1) 
Note:  Point estimates for the impact of exchange rate volatility are displayed together with their  
significance levels (***: 1 %; **: 5 %; *: 10 %). Numbers in brackets refer to the lags of the  
implemented volatility variable. 
Table A2: Regression results for Brazil (full sample) 






VOLNER_BRRUSD    /    -0.16* (-1)   -0.65* (-2) 
VOLRER_BRRUSD    /    -0.46* (-1)   -2.46*** (0) 
VOLNER_BRREUR    0.10** (-1)    -0.30*** (-2)   -0.78* (-2) 
VOLRER_BRREUR   /    /   / 
VOLNER_USDEUR   /    -2.30**  (-2)   / 
VOLRER_USDEUR   /    -2.36**  (-2)   / 
VOLREER_BRA    0.20** (-1)    -0.54** (-1)   -3.09** (0) 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_BRA    0.04* (-1)    -0.08* (-2)   -0.61*** (-1) 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_BRA    0.05** (-1)    /   -0.76*** (-1) 
VOLINTEREST_BRA    /    -0.03** (-2)   -0.11** (-1) 
VOLREALINTEREST_BRA    /    -0.03** (-2)   -0.10* (-1) 
Note:   Point estimates for the impact of exchange rate volatility are displayed together with their 
significance levels (***: 1 %; **: 5 %; *: 10 %). Numbers in brackets refer to the lags of the 
implemented volatility variable. 
    
Table A3: Regression results for Uruguay (full sample) 
 DUNEMPRATE_UY GROWTHEMP_UY GROWTH 
REALINVEST_UY
VOLNER_UYPUSD    0.28*** (0)    -2.26** (-2)   -1.53**  (0) 
 -1.16**  (-1) 
VOLRER_UYPUSD    0.27*** (0)    /    -1.46*** (0) 
VOLNER_UYPEUR    0.30*** (0)      -2.58*** (-1) 
VOLRER_UYPEUR    0.30*** (0)      -2.69*** (-1) 
VOLNER_USDEUR   /    /    -7.17*  (0) 
VOLRER_USDEUR   /    /    -6.47*  (0) 
VOLREER_UY    0.33*** (0)    /    -2.52*** (-1) 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_UY    0.11* (0)    -0.10** (-1)    -0.68** (0) 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_UY    0.18*** (0)    -0.15** (-1)    -0.96** (0) 
VOLINTEREST_UY    0.15** (0)    /    -2.81** (0) 
VOLREALINTEREST_UY    0.18* (0)    -0.19* (0)  / 
Note:   Point estimates for the impact of exchange rate volatility are displayed together with their 
significance levels (***: 1 %; **: 5 %; *: 10 %). Numbers in brackets refer to the lags of the 
implemented volatility variable. 
    
Table A4: Pairwise Granger causality tests for exogeneity, Argentina (until 1990) 
Sample: 1970 1990 
Lags: 2 
Null Hypothesis:  Obs F-Statistic Probability
DUNEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLNER_ARPUSD  18   0.12724   0.88160 
DEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLNER_ARPUSD  14   0.11310   0.89431 
GROWTHREALINVEST_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLNER_ARPUSD 
18   1.41721   0.27747 
DUNEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLRER_ARPUSD  18   0.12798   0.88096 
DEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLRER_ARPUSD  14   0.77229   0.49030 
GROWTHREALINVEST_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLRER_ARPUSD 
18   1.87850   0.19202 
DUNEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLNER_ARPEUR  10   0.41030   0.68392 
DEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLNER_ARPEUR  10   0.15039   0.86412 
GROWTHREALINVEST_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLNER_ARPEUR 
10   2.97760   0.14073 
DUNEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLRER_ARPEUR  10   0.56661   0.60007 
DEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLRER_ARPEUR  10   0.87667   0.47166 
GROWTHREALINVEST_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLRER_ARPEUR 
10   1.66061   0.27987 
DUNEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLNER_USDEUR  11   0.13773   0.87401 
DEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLNER_USDEUR  11   0.23971   0.79405 
GROWTHREALINVEST_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLNER_USDEUR 
11   3.46332   0.10000 
DUNEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLRER_USDEUR  11   0.01988   0.98038 
DEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLRER_USDEUR  11   0.07952   0.92452 
GROWTHREALINVEST_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLRER_USDEUR 
11   2.43737   0.16796 
DUNEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLREER_ARG  10   0.69747   0.54055 
DEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLREER_ARG  10   0.93030   0.45344 
GROWTHREALINVEST_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLREER_ARG 
10   1.87016   0.24752 
DUNEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_ARG 
18   0.03811   0.96272 
DEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_ARG 
14   0.35379   0.71137 
GROWTHREALINVEST_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_ARG 
18   1.19252   0.33457 
DUNEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_ARG 
18   0.10576   0.90041 
DEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_ARG 
14   0.77773   0.48803 
GROWTHREALINVEST_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_ARG 
18   1.64289   0.23114 
DUNEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLINTEREST_EUR 
18   2.60862   0.11156 
DEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLINTEREST_EUR  14   4.35821   0.04747 
GROWTHREALINVEST_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLINTEREST_EUR 
18   0.46633   0.63740 
DUNEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLREALINTEREST_ARG 
12   0.10970   0.89762 
DEMPRATE_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLREALINTEREST_ARG 
12   0.17749   0.84102 
GROWTHREALINVEST_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLREALINTEREST_ARG 
12   4.20507   0.06317 
    
Table A5: Pairwise Granger causality tests for exogeneity, Brazil (until 1993) 
Sample: 1970 1993 
Lags: 2 
Null Hypothesis:  Obs F-Statistic Probability
DUNEMPRATE_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLNER_BRRUSD  11   0.57322   0.59181 
GROWTHEMP_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLNER_BRRUSD  11   0.15391   0.86063 
GROWTHREALINVEST_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLNER_BRRUSD 
20   0.34319   0.71493 
DUNEMPRATE_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLRER_BRRUSD  11   0.02013   0.98014 
GROWTHEMP_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLRER_BRRUSD  11   0.42746   0.67057 
GROWTHREALINVEST_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLRER_BRRUSD 
20   0.31563   0.73406 
DUNEMPRATE_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLNER_BRREUR  10   0.06160   0.94096 
GROWTHEMP_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLNER_BRREUR  10   0.34632   0.72301 
GROWTHREALINVEST_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLNER_BRREUR 
13   0.76528   0.49646 
DUNEMPRATE_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLRER_BRREUR  10   0.14623   0.86753 
GROWTHEMP_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLRER_BRREUR  10   0.33368   0.73109 
GROWTHREALINVEST_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLRER_BRREUR 
13   0.05090   0.95068 
DUNEMPRATE_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLNER_USDEUR  10   1.94686   0.23698 
GROWTHEMP_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLNER_USDEUR  10   3.15206   0.13012 
GROWTHREALINVEST_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLNER_USDEUR 
14   1.50949   0.27207 
DUNEMPRATE_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLRER_USDEUR  10   1.41545   0.32576 
GROWTHEMP_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLRER_USDEUR  10   2.59733   0.16846 
GROWTHREALINVEST_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLRER_USDEUR 
14   1.42910   0.28907 
DUNEMPRATE_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLREER_BRA  10   0.27249   0.77210 
GROWTHEMP_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLREER_BRA  10   1.51958   0.30507 
GROWTHREALINVEST_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLREER_BRA 
13   0.65453   0.54543 
DUNEMPRATE_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_ARG 
11   0.00899   0.99106 
GROWTHEMP_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_ARG 
11   0.03552   0.96531 
GROWTHREALINVEST_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_ARG 
20   1.38112   0.28148 
DUNEMPRATE_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_BRA 
11   0.06423   0.93842 
GROWTHEMP_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_BRA 
11   0.14094   0.87134 
GROWTHREALINVEST_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_BRA 
20   1.61251   0.23210 
DUNEMPRATE_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLINTEREST_BRA 11   1.79351   0.24513 
GROWTHEMP_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLINTEREST_BRA 11   0.05188   0.94986 
GROWTHREALINVEST_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLINTEREST_BRA 
20   0.74368   0.49210 
DUNEMPRATE_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLREALINTEREST_BRA 
11   1.95062   0.22253 
GROWTHEMP_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLREALINTEREST_BRA 
11   0.08504   0.91956 
GROWTHREALINVEST_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLREALINTEREST_BRA 
20   0.49117   0.62141 
 
    
Table A6: Pairwise Granger causality tests for collinearity, Argentina (until 1990) 
Sample: 1970 1990 
Lags: 2 
Null Hypothesis:  Obs F-Statistic  Probability
DNER_USDEUR does not Granger Cause VOLNER_ARPUSD  10   1.64941   0.28176 
VOLNER_ARPUSD does not Granger Cause DNER_USDEUR   1.97201   0.23366 
DRER_ARPUSD does not Granger Cause VOLRER_ARPUSD  17   0.25393   0.77981 
VOLRER_ARPUSD does not Granger Cause DRER_ARPUSD   0.64730   0.54080 
DNER_ARPEUR does not Granger Cause VOLNER_ARPEUR  10   0.27593   0.76971 
VOLNER_ARPEUR does not Granger Cause DNER_ARPEUR   0.64037   0.56546 
DRER_ARPEUR does not Granger Cause VOLRER_ARPEUR  10   0.19087   0.83199 
VOLRER_ARPEUR does not Granger Cause DRER_ARPEUR   1.04636   0.41725 
DNER_USDEUR does not Granger Cause VOLNER_USDEUR  10   0.17078   0.84772 
VOLNER_USDEUR does not Granger Cause DNER_USDEUR   2.76643   0.15526 
DRER_USDEUR does not Granger Cause VOLRER_USDEUR  10   0.30133   0.75238 
VOLRER_USDEUR does not Granger Cause DRER_USDEUR   2.33932   0.19182 
DREER_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLREER_ARG  10   0.06961   0.93364 
VOLREER_ARG does not Granger Cause DREER_ARG   5.32913   0.05762 
DNEERINTRAMERC_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_ARG 
17   5.08888   0.02509 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_ARG does not Granger Cause 
DNEERINTRAMERC_ARG 
 3.16092   0.07894 
DREERINTRAMERC_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_ARG 
17   0.08418   0.91980 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_ARG does not Granger Cause 
DREERINTRAMERC_ARG 
 0.46574   0.63855 
DINTEREST_ARG does not Granger Cause VOLINTEREST_ARG  11   1.46720   0.30287 
VOLINTEREST_ARG does not Granger Cause DINTEREST_ARG   2.11429   0.20184 
DREALINTEREST_ARG does not Granger Cause 
VOLREALINTEREST_ARG 
11   1.36871   0.32382 
VOLREALINTEREST_ARG does not Granger Cause 
DREALINTEREST_ARG 
 1.94391   0.22343 
    
Table A7: Pairwise Granger causality tests for collinearity, Brazil (until 1993) 
Sample: 1970 1993 
Lags: 2 
Null Hypothesis:  Obs F-Statistic  Probability
DNER_BRRUSD does not Granger Cause VOLNER_BRRUSD  21   4.00341   0.03893 
VOLNER_BRRUSD does not Granger Cause DNER_BRRUSD   0.47820   0.62848 
DRER_BRRUSD does not Granger Cause VOLRER_BRRUSD  21   1.43466   0.26725 
VOLRER_BRRUSD does not Granger Cause DRER_BRRUSD   0.84662   0.44720 
DNER_BRREUR does not Granger Cause VOLNER_BRREUR  13   3.65378   0.07460 
VOLNER_BRREUR does not Granger Cause DNER_BRREUR   1.63188   0.25446 
DRER_BRREUR does not Granger Cause VOLRER_BRREUR  13   3.69713   0.07293 
VOLRER_BRREUR does not Granger Cause DRER_BRREUR   0.18704   0.83294 
DNER_USDEUR does not Granger Cause VOLNER_USDEUR  13   0.23825   0.79340 
VOLNER_USDEUR does not Granger Cause DNER_USDEUR   1.12704   0.37049 
DRER_USDEUR does not Granger Cause VOLRER_USDEUR  13   0.25428   0.78151 
VOLRER_USDEUR does not Granger Cause DRER_USDEUR   1.19173   0.35236 
DREER_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLREER_BRA  13   8.26253   0.01132 
VOLREER_BRA does not Granger Cause DREER_BRA   0.44627   0.65502 
DNEERINTRAMERC_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_BRA 
20   0.59728   0.56288 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_BRA does not Granger Cause 
DNEERINTRAMERC_BRA 
 2.54312   0.11193 
DREERINTRAMERC_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_BRA 
20   0.05226   0.94925 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_BRA does not Granger Cause 
DREERINTRAMERC_BRA 
 0.47821   0.62902 
DINTEREST_BRA does not Granger Cause VOLINTEREST_BRA  21   1.75644   0.20436 
VOLINTEREST_BRA does not Granger Cause DINTEREST_BRA   1.04519   0.37444 
DREALINTEREST_BRA does not Granger Cause 
VOLREALINTEREST_BRA 
21   1.76103   0.20359 
VOLREALINTEREST_BRA does not Granger Cause 
DREALINTEREST_BRA 
 0.82133   0.45756 
    
5.   Data 
CPI_ARG: Consumer Price Index Argentina (1995=100), Source: Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística y Censos, (http://www.indec.mecon.gov.ar). 
CPI_BRA: Consumer Price Index Brazil (1995=100), Source: IFS (IMF) series CPI 
(22364...ZF...) + IMF – Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports. 
CPI_PY: Consumer Price Index Paraguay (1995=100), Source: IFS (IMF) series CPI 
(22364...ZF...) + IMF – Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports and Banco 
Central del Paraguay (from September 1999 on). 
CPI_UY: Consumer Price Index Uruguay (1995=100), Source: IFS (IMF) series CPI 
+ IMF – Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports. 
CPI_EUR: Consumer Price Index (1995=100), Source: until December 1994 Bundes-
bank, from January 1995 on ECB. 
CPI_US: Consumer Price Index (1995=100), Source: IFS (IMF) series CPI 
(11164...ZF...) + IMF – Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports. 
DNER_USDEUR: = D(LOG(NER_USDEUR ))*100; growth rate of the nominal 
dollar exchange rate of the euro; the remaining exchange rate growth rates are con-
structed analogously. 
EMP_BRA: Employment general level Brazil (in thousands): Persons aged 10 years 
and over. Excl. rural population of Rondônia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará and 
Amapá. Sep. of each year. Prior to 1979: excl. rural areas of Northern Region, Mato 
Grosso, Goiás and Tocantins. 1992 methodology revised; data not strictly comparable. 
Source: LABORSTA (http://laborsta.ilo.org/), IFS (IMF) and 
http://www4.bcb.gov.br/series-i/default.asp. 
EMPRATE_ARG: Evolución de la las principales variables ocupacionales (en % of 
employed population to total population), Empleo, Tasa de Empleo en Aglomerados 
Urbanos, Source: Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, INDEC. 
http://www2.mecon.gov.ar/infoeco/. 
EMP_URU: Employment general level (in thousands), urban areas, incl. professional 
army; excl. compulsory military service, persons aged 14 years and over. 1984 and 
1986 first semester, ACLARACIÓN IMPORTANTE: Hasta el año 1997 la encuesta 
cubría a las localidades de 900 y más habitantes y a partie del año 1998 cubre de 
5.000 o más habitantes. Source: IFS (IMF), LABORSTA (http://laborsta.ilo.org/), 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (http://www.ine.gub.uy/), Principales Resultados 
Encuesta Continua de Hogares. 
EMP_PY: Employment Paraguay (in thousands), Source: Banco Central del Para-
guay, Real sector data, población ocupada 
(http://www.bcp.gov.py/gee/statistic/indice.htm), see 
http://www.ine.gub.uy/mercosur/english/cuadros/mc_3_1.htm for the data consois-
tency is massively hampered by different definitions of the sample, e.g., Metropolitan 
area of Asunción.(4) Urban area. (5) National total for urban and rural areas. Encuesta 
Permanente de Hogares. 
INTEREST_ARG: Deposit Rate (in home currency), Source: IFS (IMF) series 
21360L..ZF... . 
    
INTEREST_BRA: Money Market Rate (in home currency), Source: IFS (IMF) series 
22360B..ZF... . 
INTEREST_PY: Deposit Rate (in home currency), Source: IFS (IMF) series. 
INTEREST_UY: Deposit Rate (in home currency), Source: IFS (IMF) series. 
INTEREST_EUR: until December 1994: German money market rate, Source: Bun-
desbank; from January 1995 on: 3-month rate, Source: ECB, Monthly Reports. 
INTEREST_US: treasury bill rate, Source: Federal Reserve Bank. 
INVEST_ARG: Gross Fixed Capital Formation Argentina (millions of Arg. peso), 
Source: IMF Statistical Yearbook, IFS (IMF). 
INVEST_BRA: Gross Fixed Capital Formation Brazil (millions of real), Source: IMF 
Statistical Yearbook, IFS (IMF). 
INVEST_PY: Gross Fixed Capital Formation Paraguay (billions of guarani), Source: 
IMF Statistical Yearbook, IFS (IMF). 
INVEST_UY: Gross Fixed Capital Formation Uruguay (millions of Urug. peso), 
Source: IMF Statistical Yearbook, IFS (IMF). 
NER_ARPUSD: IMF – Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports. 
NER_BRRUSD: IMF – Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports. 
NER_PYGUSD: IMF – Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports. 
NER_UYPUSD: Banco Central del Uruguay (until June 1973) and IMF – Statistical 
Yearbook and various Monthly Reports (from July 19973 on). 
NER_USDEUR: Bilateral nominal US $/ECU exchange rate period av., Source: IMF 
– Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports, IFS (IMF) series 111..EB.ZF... . 
The remaining bilateral nominal exchange rate time series were created via cross-
rates. 
NEER_PY: Nominal effective exchange rate of the Paraguayan Guarani, Source: IFS 
(IMF) series. 
NEER_UY: Source: IFS (IMF) series. 
NEER_EUR: Nominal effective exchange rate euro zone, Source: IFS (IMF) series 
163..NEUZF... 
NEER_US: Nominal effective exchange rate of the US-dollar based on unit labor 
costs, Source, IFS (IMF) series 111..NEUZF... . 
REALINTEREST_ARG: real short-term interest rate of Argentina; INTEREST_ARG 
deflated by the consumer price index. 
REALINTEREST_BRA: real short-term interest rate of Argentina; INTEREST_BRA 
deflated by the consumer price index. 
REALINTEREST_PY: real short-term interest rate of Argentina; INTEREST_PY 
deflated by the consumer price index. 
REALINTEREST_UY: real short-term interest rate of Argentina; INTEREST_UY 
deflated by the consumer price index. 
    
REALINTEREST_EUR: real short-term interest rate of Argentina; INTEREST_EUR 
deflated by the consumer price index. 
REALINTEREST_US: real short-term interest rate of Argentina; INTEREST_US 
deflated by the consumer price index. 
REER_PY: Real effective exchange rate based on relative CPI of the Paraguayan 
Guarani, Source: IMF – Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports. 
REER_UY: Real effective exchange rate based on relative CPI, Source: IMF – Statis-
tical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports. 
REER_US: Real effective exchange rate of the US-dollar based on unit labor costs, 
Source: IFS (IMF) series 111..REUZF... . 
REER_EUR: Real effective exchange rate Euro area based on unit labor costs, 
Source: IFS (IMF), series 163..REUZF... . 
REER_ARG: Annual data: Real effective exchange rate Argentina in terms of import 
prices, Source: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe 
http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/DesarrolloEconomico. Monthly data:  
reer_arg = 
4.739*RER_ARPJPY+22.058*RER_ARPUSD+35.402*RER_ARPEUR+35.004*RE
R_ARPBRR+2.797*RER_ARPUYP (weights from Center for Global Trade Analysis 
(2001): GTAP 5: exports + imports). 
REER_BRA: Annual data: Real effective exchange rate Brazil in terms of import 
prices, Source: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe 
http://www.eclac.org//publicaciones/DesarrolloEconomico. Monthly data: reer_bra = 
8.258*RER_BRRJPY+31.974*RER_BRRUSD+41.362*RER_BRREUR+16.431*(1/R
ER_ARPBRR)+1.974*RER_BRRUYP (weights from Center for Global Trade 
Analysis (2001): GTAP 5: exports + imports). 
UNEMPRATE_ARG: Evolución de la las principales variables ocupacionales (en %), 
Desocupación (in percent), Sources: Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, INDEC. 
http://www2.mecon.gov.ar/infoeco/. 
UNEMPRATE_BRA: Unemployment rate Brazil (in percent), TAXA DE 
DESEMPREGO ABERTO - ORIGINAL E DESSAZONALIZADA - TAXAS 
MEDIAS 30 dias; Source: http://www.ibge.gov.br on the page "Indicadores Conjuntu-
rais" [Conjuncture Indicators] under the heading "Trabalho e Rendimento" [Labor and 
Income]: "Ajuste sazonal - taxa de desemprego" [Seasonal adjustment - unem-
ployment rate]. IBGE, Diretoria de pesquisas, departamento de emprego e rendimen-
to, pesquisa mensal de emprego. 
UNEMPRATE_PY: Unemployment rate Paraguay (in percent), Source: Banco Cen-
tral del Paraguay, Real sector data, población ocupada 
(http://www.bcp.gov.py/gee/statistic/indice.htm). 
UNEMPRATE_URU: Unemployment rate Uruguay (in percent), Source: Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica INE, TASA DE DESEMPLEO ANUAL - Total País urbano y 
Por Departamento, 
http://www.ine.gub.uy/bancodedatos/ECH/ECH%20TOT%20Des%20A.xls.  
VOLNEER_EUR: Exchange rate variability from NEER_EUR. 
VOLNEER_US: Exchange rate variability from NEER_US. 
VOLREER_EUR: Exchange rate variability from REER_EUR. 
    
VOLREER_US: Exchange rate variability from REER_US. 
VOL_USDEUR: Exchange rate variability from NERDOLLECU. 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_ARG = 0.926*volrer_arpbrr + 0.074*volrer_arpuyp. 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_BRA = 0.8927*volrer_arpbrr + 0.1073*volrer_brruyp. 
VOLREERINTRAMERC_UY = 0.60*volrer_brruyp + 0.40*volrer_arpuyp. 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_BRA = 0.8927*volner_arpbrr + 0.1073*volner_brruyp. 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_ARG = 0.926*volner_arpbrr + 0.074*volner_arpuyp. 
VOLNEERINTRAMERC_UY = 0.60*volner_brruyp + 0.40*volner_arpuyp. 
(weights = exports plus imports weights from Center for Global Trade Analysis 2001 
for consistency reasons) 
The remaining volatility variables are constructed analogously. 





Luís Campos e Cunha and Nuno Alves 
 
 
  This paper by Belke and Gros (BG) shows that the exchange rate volatility has a 
significant impact on employment and investment in Mercosur countries, with a special 
emphasis on Argentina and Brazil. To build the argument, BG present in section 2 some 
statistics on the degree of trade integration in the Southern cone to conclude for its low 
level when compared with EMU members. In section 3 it is modelled the impact of 
exchange rate volatility on employment. To motivate the conclusion, the authors present 
a set of regressions (sections 4 and 5) supporting the existence of real effects of exchange 
rate volatility in the Mercosur countries. 
  Due to the large scope of the paper, it may be useful to split the discussion in the 
above-presented sections, i.e., the descriptive statistics on the region, the arguments in the 
literature, the theoretical model and the empirical evidence. 
 
 
1.  The descriptive statistics 
 
The paper presents some interesting evidence on the trade relations of countries in the 
Mercosur, pointing to three conclusions.  
First, these countries are relatively closed in terms of their trade flows. Table 1 below 
shows the weight of (total) exports (X) and imports (M) as a percentage of GDP in the 
four countries of the Mercosur. The table clearly illustrates that the two “large countries” 
– accounting for around 97 per cent of the GNP of the common market – are relatively 
closed in terms of trade flows, while the two “small countries” present degrees of 














Source: IMF.  
 
Second, the weight of intra Mercosur trade on each country’s total trade is also distinct 
between countries. Although this weight has increased in the last decade in all countries, 
Brazil (and to a lesser extent Argentina) still shows a relatively low degree of trade 
integration with the other members of the common market. Of course, this has also to do 
with the mere relative size of each country. Table 2 below updates Table 2 of the paper, 




1991  1995  2000 1991 1995 2000 
Argentina  16.5  32.3  31.8 21.0 22.8 28.4 
Brazil  7.3  13.2  14.0 10.8 13.8 14.0 
Paraguay  35.1  57.5  63.5 29.9 39.4 50.6 
Uruguay  35.5  47.1  44.5 42.2 46.1 43.8 
Note: The table presents the weights of intra-MERCOSUR exports (imports) in total exports (imports) of each country 
Source: Centro de Economía International (CEI) 
Total IMPORTS  Total EXPORTS
Weights of intra Mercosur trade 
 
 
Thirdly, as a corollary, the situation does not call for the introduction of a single 
currency, as the authors argue, since the “degree of interdependence … is much lower 
than it was for EMU members at the time of the “Werner Report” when monetary union 
was proposed for the first time in Europe.” (Page 5) 
We do agree with Belke and Gros that the situation of the Mercosur today is very 
different from the one of 35 years ago in Europe. On the one hand, the level of trade 
integration was higher, and the level of financial and capital integration was certainly 
very different (and lower in this case). 
On the other hand, and more importantly, we think the conclusion of the comparison in 
BG is unfair and misleading. We think that the Mercosur does not need a single currency, 
because in a sense it already has one –the Brazilian real- that carries similar weight as the 
euro, taking into consideration the obvious differences between the Mercosur and the  
 
European Union  (EU). In other words, the Mercosur should be compared with the 
Europe of today and not with the one of the Werner Report. 
Let us now compare in Table 3 the relative importance of Brazil vis-à-vis the Mercosur 
and the relative position of the 12 Euro area countries within the EU-15 countries. We 
will use some standard relative size indicators. 
 
Table 3 
Brazil (% Mercosur)  
and 
EU-12 (% European Union) 
  Population  Area  GNP  GNP p/cap   Trade openness 
Brazil 78.9  71.8 70.8 89.8  11.2 
Euro  area  12  80.5  78.3 78.2 97.2  16.5 
Sources: WB, IMF, European Commission, Eurostat and ECB.  
Note: (Exports + Imports of goods and services) / 2*GDP. Balance of payments data (excludes 
intra EU-12 trade). 
 
The sticking similarity of the data reported in table 3 between Brazil and the euro area 
“country” raises other issues: the Banco Central do Brasil is not a supranational 
organization as the European Central Bank and there are obvious differences of 
credibility.  
However, Brazil has been able to make important reforms in several areas which makes 
the real a realistic option for a future basis of a single currency for Mercosur. In the last 4 
years Brazilian authorities introduced some discipline in its fiscal policy and the Central 
Bank has been very skilful in pursuing its monetary and exchange rate policy. It was the 
Brazilian authorities (not the IMF) that avoided contagion from Argentina. The 
consolidation of sustainable fiscal and monetary policies in Brazil will determine whether 
our daring prophecy will come true. 
 
2.  The arguments in the literature 
 
The literature studying the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows (mainly 
focusing on developed countries) is usually ambiguous on the sign of the relation. In fact, 
higher exchange rate volatility has two counteracting effects: first, it increases the 
uncertainty of the profits of exporters (when they invoice in foreign currencies); second, 
it creates profit-making opportunities. The effect of volatility on trade thus depends on 
the degree of risk aversion and risk exposure of the agents (Lafrance and Tessier, 2000).  
 
This ambiguity, added to the low degree of openness of the Mercosur as a whole, raises 
the idea that exchange rate movements could have a limited impact on this area. 
However, the paper argues (correctly) that there are some qualifications to such a 
conclusion.  
In developing countries the level and variability of the exchange rate may be more 
important than in developed countries. This is due, on the one hand, to the fact that many 
developing countries link their currencies to the dollar (either through a peg or through 
substantial management of the float). In these cases, large currency movements translate 
directly in competitiveness changes (see Reinhart and Reinhart (2001)). On the other 
hand, as described in Calvo and Reinhart (2000), developing (and also developed…) 
countries have a fear of floating. A quotation from these authors summarises this idea 
(pgs 8-9): 
“…lack of credibility may lead to a situation where policy makers wind up 
stabilizing the exchange rate even at the expense of engaging in procyclical 
policies. However, there are numerous other reasons why exchange rate 
stability may be highly sought. In Emerging Markets (EM) devaluations (or 
large depreciations) tend to be associated with recessions (…). Defaults and 
general debt servicing difficulties mount if the exchange rate is allowed to 
slide significantly. The adjustments in the current account following these 
large exchange rate swings are far more acute and abrupt in EM. Credit 
market access is adversely affected by currency instability. Exchange rate 
volatility appears to be more damaging to trade in EMs; perhaps because 
trade is predominantly invoiced in US dollars and hedging opportunities are 
more limited. The passthrough of inflation from exchange rate swings to 
inflation is far higher in EMs than in developed economies. (…) All these 
factors may explain why, at least historically there has been a marked 
tendency in most of the countries in our sample to confine exchange rate 
movements to relatively narrow bands (…) “ 
 
Other arguments could also be put forward:  
•  Recent work by Frankel and Rose (2002) suggests that the move to a currency 
union (permanent and credible exchange stability) has a very large effect on trade 
flows and on income per capita. This raises the possibility that even though trade 
flows are low, the benefits from exchange rate stability might be significant in 
Mercosur. 
•  While the low overall trade flows of the Mercosur suggest that the impact of 
exchange rate volatility may not significantly affect the region, it may nonetheless 
be very relevant for the two small countries of the region. This heterogeneity is 
de-emphasised in the paper, which mostly analyses Argentina and Brazil. 
 
Recognising the possibility that exchange rate volatility can have sizeable real effects in 
Mercosur, the paper focuses thereafter on the link between the volatility of exchange 




3.  The theoretical model 
 
Before presenting the theoretical model of the paper, it is useful to analyse the channels 
through which uncertainty (such as price or exchange rate uncertainty) can impact on 
investment. This is important since the paper does not give a balanced view of the real 
effects of uncertainty found in the literature. Instead, the authors decided to stress only 
the (intuitive) idea that increased uncertainty lowers investment and labour employment. 
However, the literature shows that the effect of uncertainty on investment decisions is 
ambiguous (see Lafrance and Tessier (2000)). This is consistent with the ambiguous 
empirical results also reported in numerous papers (see, for example, Darby et al. (1998)). 
What are the arguments supporting this ambiguity? 
1.  If the marginal revenue product of capital is convex in price, a mean-preserving 
increase in uncertainty raises the expected payoff of marginal capital (by Jensen’s 
inequality), increasing investment. 
2.  When investment is irreversible, the firm faces a higher user cost of capital than 
when investment is reversible. This user cost is higher the higher the uncertainty 
of the returns to capital. Since the firms anticipate that the irreversibility 
constraint may bind in the future, they invest less. This effect is magnified when 
uncertainty increases. 
3.  Abel and Eberly (1999) show, however, that in the irreversible investment model 
under uncertainty, there is a channel that tends to increase capital accumulation 
(and more the higher the degree of uncertainty). This channel is related to the fact 
that, at any time t, firms have a stock of previously accumulated capital. Under 
irreversibility, the firm is thus constrained by past investments (since it cannot sell 
capital in face, e.g., of an economic slowdown). This effect can lead to a higher 
capital stock under irreversibility (as compared to the case of reversible 
investments) and the more so the higher the level of uncertainty.  
4.  This latter view is generalised by Darby et al. (1998). They use a Dixit-Pindyck 
model of investment that determines a zone of inactivity within which the firm 
delays its investment decisions. They show that increasing exchange rate 
uncertainty can increase or decrease investment, depending on the conditions of 
the set-up. As reported by Lafrance and Tessier (2000), pg. 12, 
“…more exchange rate variability uncertainty can actually increase investment. (…) 
Greater exchange rate stability would encourage investment in industries with 
relatively lower productivity, high scrapping value and a low opportunity cost of 
waiting (e.g. service industries). However, greater exchange rate stability would tend to 
reduce investment in industries with low scrapping value (e.g. public utilities) or high 
entry costs (e.g. high-tech and R&D) or in industries with high scrapping values 
combined with high opportunity costs of waiting (e.g. financial services).” 
 
The model presented in the paper is a simplified version of a model incorporating the 
“option value of waiting”, i.e., the idea that it may be beneficial to wait and to delay 
investment decisions (see bullet 2. above). It is analogous to the model in Belke and Gros  
 
(2001), with the difference that the focus is not on investment decisions but rather on 
labor hiring decisions.  
The model has three periods: 
•  In period 0, the firm can open a job, and hire a worker for periods 0 and 1, who 
will then produce output (that is sold in the foreign market in periods 1 and 2 
respectively); 
•  In period 1, the firm can open a job, and hire a worker for period 1, who will then 
produce output (that is sold in the foreign market in period 2); 
•  In period 2, there is no job creation. 
To hire workers, the firms pay a start-up cost. The workers are paid a wage above their 
reservation level. 
The uncertainty of the model comes from the price of the good in the foreign market, i.e., 
from the exchange rate. 
The decisive element in the model lies in the firm’s decision to hire labor in period 0. 
Note that this decision binds the firm to stay with the worker for periods 0 and 1. Here 
lies the irreversibility component in job creation. Since in period 0 the firms do not know 
the realization of the exchange rate in that period, there may be cases in which they find 
ex-post that it would have been preferable not to produce in period 0 (delaying any job 
creation to period 1). This possibility introduces an option value of waiting and thus 
delaying job creation. In the model, the higher the exchange rate uncertainty, the higher 
the value of waiting. 
This set-up raises a number of questions. 
First, the authors assume that the irreversibility of labour hiring (and of the costs of 
hiring, training and providing the job-specific capital) is comparable, for modelling 
purposes, to the irreversibility of investment. This is questionable, even for rigid labour 
markets as in the EU or in the Mercosur. Two issues should be highlighted in this 
context:  
•  The relation between regulations and performance in the labour market is 
complex and ambiguous (see, in particular, the conclusions of Blanchard and 
Portugal (2001) for the US and Portuguese cases);  
•  The model assumes complete enforceability of labour contracts, which may not be 
a good description of the functioning of the labour market, in particular in cases of 
severe economic instability. 
 
Second, in the theoretical model all firms are exporters. Since the empirical tests that 
follow focus on countries that are relatively closed to the rest of the world, it would be 
interesting to discuss the impact of introducing a tradable/non-tradable dimension to the 
model. In this case an increase in exchange rate volatility could have a (negative) level 
effect on investment, but also a substitution effect (or portfolio shift) from the tradable to  
 
the non–tradable sector. If the latter is more labour-intensive than the former, the impact 
of exchange rate volatility on job-creation could even be positive. 
Third, the exchange rate is assumed to be a random walk. This is an important 
assumption of the model, since it allows the unconditional expected return of waiting in 
period zero (equation (3)) to depend only on the exchange rate observed in period 1 
(which is also the expected exchange rate for period 2). Even though the assumption of a 
random walk process for the exchange rate seems justifiable under certain monetary 
policy regimes, it is important to stress this crucial assumption. Furthermore, it could also 
be interesting to discuss other cases in which the volatility of the exchange rate is 
endogenous and dependent on the exchange policy rule pursued by the central bank.  
 
 
4.  The empirical evidence 
 
BG perform an extensive exercise regressing changes in investment/(un)employment on 
measures of exchange rate or interest rate volatility. These exercises raise a number of 
questions (some of which acknowledged by the authors), which we present in turn. 
 
4.1.  The order of integration of the variables 
 












0 β α α  
where  t I ∆  is the first difference of the real variable in question (employment, 
unemployment or investment) and  Xvol is the level of the interest or exchange rate 
volatility. These variables are assumed to be I(0), but no ADF tests are presented to 
assess this. In particular, the stationarity of the volatility measures is surely controversial, 
due to the exchange rate crisis experienced by the countries in study. Figure 1 shows the 
graph of the volatility (and first difference) of the nominal exchange rate volatility of the 
Argentinean peso vis-à-vis the dollar. While the standard ADF tests do not reject the 
stationarity of DVol_X_rate (and are robust across sub-samples), the case is much more 
borderline for Vol_X_rate (since the conclusion depends on the sample period). A 
discussion of this issue should be included in the paper.  
 
Figure 1 











4.2.  The sample period 
 
Due to data constraints, the regressions are run with quite few observations (from a 
minimum of 10 to a maximum of 18). With the inclusion of one regressor (sometimes 
lagged) and sporadic dummies, the degrees of freedom become scarce. This implies that 
the results may be very sensitive to outliers. 
 
4.3.  Replicating some of the results 
 
Since the authors present an example regression for Argentina (see Table 4, pg. 28), we 
decided to replicate, as far as possible, the results of the authors in order to gain some 
insights on the reasons driving the results. 
Since we were not able to find a long run series for unemployment
1 in Argentina, we 
regressed instead the change in real gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). All data were 
taken from the IFS of the IMF.  
                                                 
1 The web site referred to by the authors had a long series for unemployment only for the period 1982-2001.  
 

























The results of the regression are presented below (as in the paper, we also included 
dummies for the years 1974 and 1975 though the authors do not present their underlying 
rationale). The sample period ends in 1990, since the Argentinean currency board was 
implemented in 1991. 
The number of lags in the regression presented in Table 4 of the paper is not balanced 
between the dependent and the independent variables. The authors do not give reasons for 
this option (though it shouldn’t affect the results much). We decided to test the optimal 
number of lags in the regression with the usual criteria (AIC, SB, HQ). All tests pointed 
to 0 as the optimal number of lags. However, the residuals had some autocorrelation so 
we present the results with one lag (this does not change any of the conclusions below). 
 
 
EQ(17) Modelling DGFCF by OLS  (using Argentina.in7) 
The present sample is:  1972 to 1990 
 
Variable      Coefficient    Std.Error  t-value  t-prob PartR^2 
Constant        -0.019450     0.030841   -0.631  0.5392  0.0297 
DGFCF_1         -0.027781      0.17134   -0.162  0.8737  0.0020 
Vol_X_rate     -0.0019376   0.00087626   -2.211  0.0455  0.2733 
D74               0.16061      0.10597    1.516  0.1536  0.1502 
D75               0.51043      0.11315    4.511  0.0006  0.6102 
Vol_X_rate_1   0.00063007   0.00091219    0.691  0.5019  0.0354 
  
 
R^2 = 0.657153  F(5,13) = 4.9836 [0.0091]  \sigma = 0.1008  DW = 2.16 
RSS = 0.1320880809 for 6 variables and 19 observations 
 
 
AR 1- 2 F( 2, 11) =     2.1326 [0.1649]    
ARCH 1  F( 1, 11) =    0.11723 [0.7385]    
Normality Chi^2(2)=     0.6056 [0.7387]    
Xi^2    F( 8,  4) =    0.36977 [0.8922]    
RESET   F( 1, 12) =    0.29503 [0.5970]    
 
 
















Note that the volatility of the exchange rate enters with a negative and significant 
coefficient.  
The same conclusion would apply if we considered the variable Vol_X_rate as I(1) and 
regressed the equation as an ADL instead: 
  
 
EQ(18) Modelling GFCF by OLS  (using Argentina.in7) 
The present sample is:  1972 to 1990 
 
Variable      Coefficient    Std.Error  t-value  t-prob PartR^2 
Constant          0.12234      0.45462    0.269  0.7921  0.0055 
GFCF_1            0.94887      0.15721    6.036  0.0000  0.7370 
Vol_X_rate     -0.0021751   0.00090446   -2.405  0.0318  0.3079 
Vol_X_rate_1   0.00068437   0.00096540    0.709  0.4909  0.0372 
D74               0.14206      0.11905    1.193  0.2541  0.0987 
D75               0.45381      0.11471    3.956  0.0016  0.5462 
 
R^2 = 0.822288  F(5,13) = 12.03 [0.0002]  \sigma = 0.103221  DW = 2.15 
RSS = 0.1385083576 for 6 variables and 19 observations 
 
 
AR 1- 2 F( 2, 11) =     2.5829 [0.1203]    
ARCH 1  F( 1, 11) =    0.20749 [0.6576]    
Normality Chi^2(2)=   0.054284 [0.9732]    
Xi^2    F( 8,  4) =    0.18335 [0.9797]    
RESET   F( 1, 12) =    0.17946 [0.6793]    
 


















The conclusions are the same as in the I(0) case. In the following, we will thus assume, in 
line with the authors, that the volatility measure is stationary. 
 
Below, we report some robustness exercises. The results suggest that two issues 
completely determine the results: a) the dummies for 1974 and 1975; b) the exchange rate 
crisis in 1989. 
 
a) Re-running the first regressing without the dummies 
 
EQ(19) Modelling DGFCF by OLS  (using Argentina.in7) 
The present sample is:  1972 to 1990 
 
Variable      Coefficient    Std.Error  t-value  t-prob PartR^2 
Constant         0.010532     0.044916    0.234  0.8178  0.0037 
DGFCF_1           0.12741      0.25432    0.501  0.6237  0.0165 
Vol_X_rate    -0.00083175    0.0012682   -0.656  0.5218  0.0279 
Vol_X_rate_1  -0.00035774    0.0013637   -0.262  0.7966  0.0046 
 
R^2 = 0.0655522  F(3,15) = 0.35075 [0.7892]  \sigma = 0.154922  DW = 1.80 
RSS = 0.360013487 for 4 variables and 19 observations 
 
 
AR 1- 2 F( 2, 13) =     1.0426 [0.3802]    
ARCH 1  F( 1, 13) =    0.12892 [0.7253]    
Normality Chi^2(2)=     5.2564 [0.0722]    
Xi^2    F( 6,  8) =      1.732 [0.2310]    
Xi*Xj   F( 9,  5) =     7.6598 [0.0186] *  
RESET   F( 1, 14) =     3.6571 [0.0765]     
 


















b) including a dummy for 1989 (and keeping the other dummies) 
 
EQ(27) Modelling DGFCF by OLS  (using Argentina.in7) 
The present sample is:  1972 to 1990 
 
Variable      Coefficient    Std.Error  t-value  t-prob PartR^2 
Constant        -0.017094     0.032351   -0.528  0.6068  0.0227 
DGFCF_1         -0.024448      0.17721   -0.138  0.8926  0.0016 
Vol_X_rate     -0.0028484    0.0023414   -1.217  0.2472  0.1098 
Vol_X_rate_1    0.0010637    0.0013947    0.763  0.4604  0.0462 
D74               0.15842      0.10961    1.445  0.1740  0.1483 
D75               0.55318      0.15473    3.575  0.0038  0.5158 
D89               0.11840      0.28071    0.422  0.6806  0.0146 
 
R^2 = 0.662162  F(6,12) = 3.92 [0.0211]  \sigma = 0.104147  DW = 2.15 




AR 1- 2 F( 2, 10) =     1.6226 [0.2453]    
ARCH 1  F( 1, 10) =    0.18814 [0.6737]    
Normality Chi^2(2)=    0.86204 [0.6498]    
RESET   F( 1, 11) =    0.49816 [0.4950]    
















Looking at the graphs of the exchange rate volatility and the change in GFCF explains the 
reason for these results. 











In 1975, both variables commove positively, so the dummy for that year is significant. In 
1989, both variables strongly commove negatively, so this year is crucial to obtain the 
negative relation between volatility and investment.  
These experiments show that the results are very much dependent on the important 
outliers present in the data.  
In the conclusion, the authors claim that (pg. 35) “Our analysis is more appropriate for 
countries and time periods during which there are no violent regime shifts. Our results 
should become relevant when MERCOSUR countries have shifted to a “normal” regime 
(…)”.  
But we would argue that it is precisely the occurrence of those “violent regime shifts” 




4.4.  Three specific comments 
 
Still regarding the empirical evaluation described in the paper, three further comments 
can be highlighted: 
•  The regressions presented by the authors could usefully be complemented with an 
explicit analysis of impulse response functions. These would allow making a 
more precise evaluation of the sign and statistical significance of the relations in 
study, in particular when the VARs allow for potentially rich dynamics.  
•  To test the robustness of the relation between the exchange rate variability and 
employment/investment, the authors decided to include a third variable in the 
regression, to proxy for misalignments of the real exchange rate (pages 29-32). 
However, the chosen variable was simply the first difference of the real exchange 
rate. This does not seem to be appropriate since it neglects the level against which 
we are measuring the misalignment. A better variable would be the deviations of 
the real exchange rate from an “equilibrium path”, defined by an HP filter or an 
estimated exchange rate equation (see Lafrance and Tessier (2000)).  
•  During the sample period, both Brazil and Argentina were characterised by 
several different exchange rate regimes. Argentina, for example
3, was 
characterised by a fixed exchange rate regime in the beginning of 1970 and in 
1973/74; a period with strong devaluations in 1974/75 which was followed by 
crawling pegs (until the beginning of the 80’s); a floating exchange rate regime 
from 1981 until 1985; a period with sharp exchange rate instability (in the end of 
the 80’s and beginning of the 90’s); and, the implementation of a currency board 
from 1991 until 2001. Even excluding the period of the currency board it is hard 
                                                 
2 One could also argue that missing third variables may also impact on the results. The authors 
acknowledge that on pages 39-42. 
3 This brief summary draws on Table 4 of the first version of the paper.  
 
to escape the critique of regime shifts in the sample period. Thus it would seem 
necessary – though the number of observations is a severe shortcoming – to 
perform some stability tests of the results, otherwise a word of caution on the 




5.  Conclusions 
 
This is a thought provocative paper, which surveys and discusses some interesting 
arguments as to the relation between financial market instability and real variables in 
Mercosur countries.  
Despite some criticisms on the empirical front and on the theoretical applicability of the 
model to the countries in the Southern cone, the paper is a good contribution to an 
ongoing debate concerning the impact of the exchange rate regime and the real behaviour 
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The authors discuss the impact of exchange rate (and interest rate) volatility on 
investment and employment, and relate this impact to the debate on monetary unions 
(MUs) and, in particular, on the pors and cons of a MU among members of Mercosur. As 
I understand it, the implicit assumption that ties both themes is the association between 
having a common currency and reducing exchange rate volatility. In passing, they argue 
that Mercosur countries are different from EMU in that they are less open economies 
(and, accordingly, economies with weaker trade links with each other), but that they are 
similar in terms of labor market rigidity, substantial in both cases.  
 
After a middle section in which they present an irreversible investment à la Dixit-
Pyndick model to illustrate the negative impact of exchange rate volatility on 
employment, they present an empirical section in which they run small-sample country 
regressions using annual data to show that various measures of exchange rate (and 
interest rate) volatility are negatively correlated with investment and employment in 
Argentina and Brasil, from which they conclude that a MU between these two countries 
would lead to higher employment and investment, in line with their analytical model. To 
address potential endogeneity problems they report Granger causality tests on pairs of 
dependent (i.e., real) and independent (i.e., nominal) variables (e.g., exchange rate 
volatility and employment) and finds that nominal variables lead real ones. 
 
At this point, I would like to note that the title seems to be somewhat at odds with the 
contents: What is exactly the difference between Mercosur and EMU mentioned there? 
While, as the authors state, labor markets are as rigid in Mercosur countries as they are in 
EMU, the reported correlation between exchange rate volatility and employment is 
presumably also present in EMU countries (they authors may want to include a 
comparison along these lines in the paper).  
 
On the paper itself, I have a general comment that relates to what appears to be the broad 
objective of the paper. The paper’s underlying silogism seems to be the following: i) 
nominal volatility has negative real effects; ii) a MU reduces nominal volatility; therefore 
iii) a MU has positive real effects. This silogism is open to an obvious remark:
1 A MU 
reduces exchange rate volatility only between member countries. Hence, even if we 
accept that the peso-dollar volatility (one of the exchange rate volatility measures used in 
the paper) significantly harms investment in Argentina, a Mercosur MU does not 
mitigates this problem. In other words, the only volatility measure that might be 
potentially relevant to the discussion is the intra-Mercosur exchange rate volatility, 
                                                 
1 Interestingly, the authors acknowledged this point by quoting Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999), 
where the remark is made. namely, the bilateral exchange rate volatility between this two countries. Accordingly, I 
would have concentrated the empirical analysis in the paper on this variable. 
 
Instead, the paper reports a number of tests on differente measures of exchange rate and 
interest rate volatility. I am concerned with the robustness of these tests. Take, for 
example, the case of Argentina. The paper presents regressions of employment, 
unemployment and investment, using lags of the dependent variable and a 
contemporaneous measure of exchange rate (alternatively, interest rate) volatility, based 
on a sample of 18 observations (the authors exclude the currency board period, but not 
the previous hyperinflation episodes). In turn, they find that years with high volatility 
coincided with years of an increase in unemployment (or a decline in investment). At first 
sight, this is not surprising, particularly after a quick look at the charts included in the 
paper: it is clear from them that, at the time of the currency crises that led to 
hyperinflation, nominal volatility increased and employment and investment ratios 
declined possibly reflecting the slowdown in economic actrivity. But the evidence points 
at a nominal instability that goes beyond what the bilateral exchange rate volatility 
between Mercosur countries that a MU might eliminate. My conjecture is that the results 
would change, if not disappear altogether, if a currency crisis dummy (or other 
macroeconomic control such as the inflation rate) were included in the regression, or the 
hyperinflation period were excluded from the sample. More in general, one has to bear in 
mind that it is extremely difficult to identify causality between macroeconomic variables 
in times of distress using annual data.
2  
 
The causality test do not quite address these concerns. The fact that nominal variables 
Granger-cause real ones is not surprising in emerging economies, probably due to the fact 
that real variables take more time to fully adjust to the new macreoconomic context.
3 At 
any rate, the Granger tests presented in the paper are not enough to dispel my concerns 
that the findings may suffer from a ommited variable problem.  
 
In light of the above, two unexpected results (at least, unexpected for me) deserve some 
discussion. On the the impact of the Euro-dollar exchange rate volatility for Argentina 
(they are much weaker for Brazil), I can only conjecture that this is reflecting the strong 
dollar indexation of the Argentinean peso, but more rigorous testing (and a good 
consistent hypothesis) would help place this finding in context. At any rate, it is not 
straightforward to articulate this result with the question about a common Mercosur 
currency. 
 
On the impact of intra-Mercosur volatility on real variables (which, as I mentioned, is the 
relevant test for the purposes of the paper), I wonder to what extent it is actually being 
driven by the peso-dollar volatility (which is highly correlated with peso-real volatility). 
                                                 
2 A good illustration of this problem is provided by the financial crisis literature, where most of the action 
is explained by contemporaneous variables and causality issues are left to the authors’ interpretation. 
3 Indeed, it is easy to verify that a simple regression of Argentine GDP growth on the EMBI_AR sovereign 
risk index shows that the index explains about half of quarterly GDP variation in Argentina since its 
creation in 1993, and Granger causality test indicates that the index always leads GDP growth by one to 
two quarters, depending on the period of analysis. See, e.g., Levy Yeyati (2001). Again, the question is not easy to illuminate. Take, for example, the Brazilian devaluation 
of January 1999 or the Argentine devaluation of January 2002. Since in both cases, both 
measures of volatility (within Mercosur and vis a vis the U.S. dollar) increased 
substantially, and their specific effects cannot be disentangled if they are tested 
separately. This problem can be partially addressed by controlling for the peso-dollar 
(alternatively, the real-dollar) exchange rate volatility while testing for the impact of 
intra-Mercosur exchange rate volatility. 
 
The finding of an independent real impact of the real-peso volatility in this context would 
provide some preliminary support for the argument in favor of a common Mercosur 
currency, and the first step for a rigorous and more comprehensive analysis that addresses 
the small sample problem
4 while introducing additional controls as suggested above. If, 
on the contrary, intra-Mercosur nominal volatility is found to be irrelevant for real 
variables (either because the correlation is explained by common ommited factors or 
dominated by the variability against U.S. variables), we could then safely exclude the 
nominal variability argument from the debate on a monetary union within Mercosur. 
                                                 
4 The authors may want to check their findings using a 2-country panel as an alternative to country-specific 
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